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Much of the policy debate and scholarly literature on network neutrality has addressed whether the 
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has statutory authority to require Internet Service 
Providers (“ISPs”) to operate in a nondiscriminatory manner.  Such analysis largely focuses on 
questions about jurisdiction, the scope of lawful regulation, and the balance of power between 
stakeholders—generally adverse to government oversight and government agencies—apparently 
willing to overcome the same inclination.  The public policy debate primarily considers micro-level 
issues without much thought about broader concerns such as First Amendment values. 
While professing to support marketplace resource allocation and a regulation-free Internet, the FCC 
has selectively imposed compulsory duties on ISPs who qualify for classification as largely 
unregulated information service providers.  Such regulation can tilt the competitive playing field, 
possibly favoring some First Amendment speakers to the detriment of others.  Yet the FCC has 
summarily dismissed any concerns that the Commission’s regulatory regime inhibits First 
Amendment-protected expression. 
For their part, ISPs have evidenced inconsistency in how seriously they value and exercise their 
First Amendment speaker rights.  Such reticence stems, in part, from the fact that ISPs combine the 
provision of conduits, using telecommunications transmission capacity, with content.  While not 
operating as regulated common carriers (the traditional classification of conduit-only providers), 
ISPs can avoid tort and copyright liability when they refrain from operating as speakers and 
editors of content.  In other instances, the same enterprise becomes an aggressive advocate for First 
Amendment speaker rights when selecting content, packaging it into an easily accessible and user-
friendly “walled garden” and employing increasingly sophisticated information processing 
techniques to filter, prioritize, and inspect digital packets. 
Technological and marketplace convergence creates the ability and incentive for ISPs to operate as 
publishers, editors, content aggregators, and non-neutral conduit providers.  No single First 
Amendment media model (print, broadcast, cable television, and telephone) or legislative 
definition of “service” (telecommunications, telecommunications service, and information service) 
covers every ISP activity.  Despite the lack of a single applicable model and the fact that ISPs 
provide different services, the FCC continues to apply a single, least-regulated classification.  The 
inclination to classify everything that an ISP does into one category promotes administrative 
convenience, but ignores the complex nature of ISP services and the potential to harm individuals, 
groups, and First Amendment values absent government oversight.  For example, the information 
service classification enables ISPs to engage in price and quality of service discrimination that 
network neutrality advocates worry will distort a free marketplace of ideas. 
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This paper will examine the different First Amendment rights and responsibilities borne by ISPs 
when they claim to operate solely as conduits and when they combine conduit and content.  The 
paper will show that ISPs face conflicting motivations, with light FCC regulation favoring 
diversification into content management services like that provided by editors and cable television 
operators, but with legislatively conferred exemptions from liability available when ISPs avoid 
managing content.  The paper concludes that current media models provide inconsistent and 
incomplete direction on how to consider ISPs’ joint provision of conduit and content.  The paper 
provides insights on how a hybrid model can address media convergence and promote First 
Amendment values while imposing reasonable nondiscrimination responsibilities on ISPs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) can exploit inflexible and di-
chotomous regulatory classifications to qualify as both creators and 
managers of content, and as intentionally neutral conduits of content 
created by others.  With nimble maneuvering, ISPs can toggle be-
tween claiming First Amendment-protected speaker rights1 and in-
voking “safe harbor”2 exemptions from liability for the content they 
carry.3  In the first instance, ISPs claim private property ownership 
rights,4 the need to manage their networks,5 their qualification as 
 
 1 See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1409 (1986) 
(“[T]he freedom of speech guaranteed by the first amendment amounts to a protection 
of autonomy—it is the shield around the speaker.”); Robert C. Post, Viewpoint Discrimina-
tion and Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 169, 176 (2007) (“[T]he First Amendment 
protects speakers’ rights so that speakers can participate as they deem necessary in the 
formation of public opinion.  This protection follows from the premise that the purpose 
of the First Amendment is to protect processes of democratic legitimation, and from the 
claim that autonomy of participation in public discourse is necessary for democratic legi-
timation.”). 
 2 A safe harbor constitutes “[a]n area or means of protection . . . [or a] provision (as in a 
statute or regulation) that affords protection from liability or penalty.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1363 (8th ed. 2004). 
 3 Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act provides a safe harbor exemption 
from liability by eliminating the classification of providers and users of interactive com-
puter service as speakers or publishers when delivering and presenting information pro-
vided by another information content provider.  Communications Decency Act of 1996 
§ 509, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).  Section 230(f)(2) defines interactive computer ser-
vice as “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or 
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a 
service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or servic-
es offered by libraries or educational institutions.”  Id. § 230(f)(2).  Information content 
provider “means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the crea-
tion or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interac-
tive computer service.”  Id. § 230(f)(3). 
 4 See, e.g., Verizon Online Terms of Service, Attachment A:  Acceptable Use Policy 11 
(2009), http://www22.verizon.com/terms/files/FiOS_Internet_TOS.pdf (“Verizon re-
serves the sole discretion to deny or restrict your Service, or immediately to suspend or 
terminate your Service, if the use of your Service by you or anyone using it, in our sole 
discretion, violates the Agreement or other Verizon policies, is objectionable or unlawful, 
interferes with the functioning or use of the Internet or the Verizon network by Verizon 
or other users, or violates the terms of this Acceptable Use Policy (“AUP”).”). 
 5 See Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,058 (2008) (memorandum opinion and order) 
(“Comcast and several other commenters maintain a continual refrain that all network 
providers must manage bandwidth in some manner and that providers need flexibility to 
engage in the reasonable network management practices.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (footnote call numbers omitted)), rev’d, Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., No. 08-1291, 
slip op. (D.C. Cir. April 6, 2010), available at http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/
opinions/201004/08-1291-1238302.pdf. 
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largely unregulated information services providers,6 and ample com-
petition in the marketplace of ideas via an Internet-mediated forum,7 
collectively support the view that government has limited, if any, 
oversight responsibilities.  In the second instance, ISPs eschew any 
content creator or manager activities with an eye toward maintaining 
legislatively conferred insulation from liability for any harms resulting 
from the content they carry. 
ISPs seemingly can turn on and off their speaker status to qualify 
for two different types of limits on government regulation of the con-
tent they deliver.  When operating ostensibly as neutral conduits, 
these episodic advocates of free expression gladly abandon this status 
for an even more desirable one:  qualifying for safe harbor exemp-
tions from tort8 and copyright infringement liability.9  Unlike other 
media, such as cable television, whose operators rejected any parallel 
to conduit neutrality as anathema to their First Amendment speaker 
rights,10 ISPs heretofore have embraced conduit neutrality, which vi-
 
 6 Information service is defined as “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, 
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information 
via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use 
of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunica-
tions system or the management of a telecommunications service.”  47 U.S.C. § 153(20) 
(2006). 
 7 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, New Media in Old Bottles?  Barron’s Contextual First Amendment 
and Copyright in the Digital Age, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 952, 956 (2008) (“Today, anyone 
with access to a computer or smart phone can disseminate text, images, sounds, and vid-
eo the world over.  In our era of ubiquitous ‘cheap speech,’ some commentators insist, we 
have no need for speaker rights of access to the print and broadcast media (even if we did 
before the digital era); indeed, we have little justification for imposing any regulation on 
the mass media to further expressive diversity and informed public discussion of impor-
tant issues.”); see also Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in 
First Amendment Theory:  Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 
1083, 1083 (1999) (“Over the years, it has not been uncommon for scholars or jurists to 
analogize the right of free expression to a marketplace in which contrasting ideas com-
pete for acceptance among a consuming public.”); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What 
It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1847 (1995) (predicting that “the new technologies will 
make it much easier for all ideas, whether backed by the rich or the poor, to participate 
in the marketplace”). 
 8 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (providing protection for the blocking and screening of offensive ma-
terial). 
 9 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 § 202(a), 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) (detailing 
limitations on copyright infringement liability relating to material online). 
 10 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 653 (1994) (Turner I) (“Appellants 
maintain that the must-carry provisions trigger strict scrutiny because they compel cable 
operators to transmit speech not of their choosing.  Relying principally on Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, appellants say this intrusion on the editorial control of cable op-
erators amounts to forced speech which, if not per se invalid, can be justified only if nar-
rowly tailored to a compelling government interest.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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tiates their expressive freedom but qualifies them for insulation from 
content liability. 
This win-win brinksmanship opportunity shows how ISPs can ex-
ploit technological and market convergence to secure competitive 
advantages based on government-conferred regulatory classifica-
tions.11  By qualifying for different types of exemption from govern-
ment oversight based on shifting status as speaker and non-speaker, 
ISPs can engage in regulatory arbitrage, i.e., strategic use of regulato-
ry classifications to avoid costly government oversight still applicable 
to competitors.  For example, ISPs currently avoid regulation when 
they deliver video programming that duplicates and increasingly con-
stitutes a competitive alternative to both broadcast and cable televi-
sion.12 
This paper will examine the different First Amendment rights and 
responsibilities borne by ISPs when they claim to operate solely as 
conduits and when they combine conduit and content.  The paper 
will show that ISPs face conflicting motivations in light of FCC regula-
tion favoring diversification into content management and informa-
tion processing services, as opposed to legislatively conferred exemp-
tions from liability available when ISPs avoid managing content.  The 
paper concludes that current media models provide inconsistent and 
incomplete direction on how to consider ISPs’ joint provision of con-
duit and content.  The paper provides insights on how a hybrid mod-
el can address media convergence and promote First Amendment 
values while imposing reasonable nondiscrimination responsibilities 
on ISPs. 
This paper concludes that conferring ISPs absolute First Amend-
ment speaker priority ignores or subordinates equally worthy expres-
 
 11 See generally Rob Frieden, What Do Pizza Delivery and Information Services Have in Common?  
Lessons From Recent Judicial and Regulatory Struggles with Convergence, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER 
& TECH. L.J. 247 (2006) (discussing why the Supreme Court’s affirming the FCC’s classifi-
cation of DSL as an information service effectively provides ISPs with a blanket deregula-
tory safe harbor). 
 12 See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Vid-
eo Programming, 24 F.C.C.R. 542, 548 (2009) (“In addition, [Local Exchange Carri-
ers] . . . are increasingly utilizing Internet Protocol Television (“IPTV”) technologies.  Ve-
rizon’s FTTH [fiber to the home] network, marketed under the brand name ‘FiOS,’ 
allows delivery of multichannel video services, in addition to telephony and high-speed 
Internet access service.  At the end of 2006, Verizon reported that it offered video pro-
gramming via FiOS to more than 2.4 million households in 200 cities in 10 states and 
served 207,000 subscribers.”).  Internet Protocol Television (“IPTV”) offers access to vid-
eo programming via the Internet.  Users can download files that contain such content for 
subsequent viewing.  Alternatively, they can receive an online “stream” of video packets 
corresponding to an existing file, or a simulcast of “live” programming. 
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sion rights of ISP subscribers and content providers that need tempo-
rary passage through ISP networks.  Put simply, ISPs should not have 
absolute freedom to invoke First Amendment priority when electing 
to operate as content creators/managers, but also the ability to evade 
regulation by invoking safe harbor exemptions when operating as 
quasi-neutral conduits.  The paper concludes that structural separa-
tion of conduit and content functions provide ISPs with a simple, low 
cost vehicle to serve both markets in much the same way as incum-
bent telecommunications ventures created separate subsidiaries and 
spun-off ventures to serve wireless and directory publishing markets. 
I.  ISPS OPERATE AS CONTENT CREATORS AND MANAGERS, AS WELL AS 
CONDUITS 
Both the United States Congress and the FCC have not fully ad-
dressed the consequences of technological and marketplace conver-
gence that eliminates mutual exclusivity between ventures that oper-
ate as conduits for the delivery of content and ventures that create, 
edit, moderate, and otherwise select and package content.  Tradi-
tionally, telecommunications services providers have qualified for 
regulatory status as common carriers13 based on their decision to op-
erate solely as ventures delivering content created by others.  The 
FCC relied on this conduit election and later required carriers oper-
ating as both conduit and content providers to create a separate sub-
sidiary for offering any non-conduit, information creation, or 
processing function.14  The FCC subsequently abandoned structural 
separation based primarily on unproven carrier assertions that the 
requirement triggered burdensome costs, loss of operational efficien-
cy, and infrastructure investment disincentives.15 
 
 13 See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–74 (2006) (requiring providers of ba-
sic telecommunications services to operate on a nondiscriminatory, common carrier ba-
sis, providing services on just and reasonable charges and also subject to numerous entry 
regulations and tariffing, interconnection, and operating requirements). 
 14 The FCC crafted a basic and enhanced services dichotomy with the former referring to 
telecommunications, regulated as essential public utility services, and enhanced services, 
unregulated and offered by a separate subsidiary.  See Amendment of Section 64.702 of 
the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 
486–87 (1980) (final decision), reconsidered in 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980) and 88 F.C.C.2d 512, 
550 (1981), aff’d sub nom., Computer and Commc’n. Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 
220 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983); Regulatory and Policy Problems 
Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communications Services and Facil-
ities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 285–86 (1971) (final decision and order), aff’d in part sub nom., 
GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973), remanded to 40 F.C.C.2d 293 (1973). 
 15 Computer III Further Remand Proceedings:  Bell Operating Company Provision of En-
hanced Services, 14 F.C.C.R. 4289, 4289–93 (1999) (report and order); Computer III Fur-
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For instances where a venture provides both conduit and content, 
such as broadcasting and cable television, the inclusion of the latter 
functions qualifies the venture for conditional First Amendment 
speaker rights.16  Broadcasters may qualify for comparatively fewer 
expression rights than those accruing to their consumers based on 
spectrum scarcity and other public policy factors,17 but the content 
delivery function they perform does not diminish their threshold qu-
alification as First Amendment speakers.  Similarly, cable television 
operators have recognized First Amendment speaker rights, condi-
tioned not by the fact that they use spectrum and telecommunication 
networks to deliver content, but because reasonable governmental in-
terests, e.g., preserving commercial broadcasting, can limit and con-
strain the potential adverse economic impact of cable television mar-
ket entry vis-à-vis  incumbent local broadcasters.18 
 
ther Remand Proceedings:  Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services, 13 
F.C.C.R. 6040, 6045–48 (1998) (further notice of proposed rulemaking), reconsidered in 14 
F.C.C.R. 21628, 21628–30 (1999); Computer III Remand Proceedings:  Bell Operating 
Company Safeguards and Tier I Local Exchange Company Safeguards, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571, 
7572 (1991) (report and order), vacated in part and remanded, California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 
919 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1050 (1995); Computer III Remand Proceed-
ings, 5 F.C.C.R. 7719, 7720 (1990) (report and order), reconsidered in 7 F.C.C.R. 909 
(1992), petition for review denied, California v. FCC, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993); Amend-
ment to Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer In-
quiry), 2 F.C.C.R. 3072, 3073–74 (1987) (report and order); Amendment of Section 
64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C. 
2d 958, 1130 (1986) (report and order), reconsidered in 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987), 3 F.C.C.R. 
1135 (1988) and 4 F.C.C.R. 5927 (1989), vacated in part, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
 16 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (“There can be no disa-
greement on an initial premise:  Cable programmers and cable operators engage in and 
transmit speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and press provi-
sions of the First Amendment.”). 
 17 See id. at 637 (“It is true that our cases have permitted more intrusive regulation of broad-
cast speakers than of speakers in other media.”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 
367, 386–90 (1969) (“Although broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First 
Amendment interest, differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in 
the First Amendment standards applied to them.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 18 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 632–33 (“Congress found that the physical charac-
teristics of cable transmission, compounded by the increasing concentration of economic 
power in the cable industry, are endangering the ability of over-the-air broadcast televi-
sion stations to compete for a viewing audience and thus for necessary operating reve-
nues.  Congress determined that regulation of the market for video programming was 
necessary to correct this competitive imbalance.”); see also id. at 647 (“By preventing cable 
operators from refusing carriage to broadcast television stations, the must-carry rules en-
sure that broadcast television stations will retain a large enough potential audience to 
earn necessary advertising revenue—or, in the case of noncommercial broadcasters, suffi-
cient viewer contributions—to maintain their continued operation.  In so doing, the pro-
visions are designed to guarantee the survival of a medium that has become a vital part of 
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In a similar fashion, the FCC has chosen to subordinate or ignore 
ISPs’ conduit function that uses owned or leased telecommunications 
networks to deliver content.19  Many ISPs provide both Internet 
access, i.e., a conduit for subscribers to access Internet-mediated con-
tent, and content in the form of World Wide Web pages.  The Com-
mission has evidenced an apparent inability to subject a single enter-
prise to two different regulatory classifications even when such a 
venture actually provides both types of service,20 as often occurs.  In 
 
the Nation’s communication system, and to ensure that every individual with a television 
set can obtain access to free television programming.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 19 See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facili-
ties, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4823 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed rulemak-
ing) (“Cable modem service is not itself and does not include an offering of telecommu-
nications service to subscribers.  We disagree with commenters that urge us to find a 
telecommunications service inherent in the provision of cable modem service.  Consistent 
with the statutory definition of information service, cable modem service provides the ca-
pabilities described above ‘via telecommunications.’  That telecommunications compo-
nent is not, however, separable from the data-processing capabilities of the service.  As 
provided to the end user the telecommunications is part and parcel of cable modem ser-
vice and is integral to its other capabilities.” (footnote call numbers omitted)), aff’d sub 
nom., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); see 
also Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facili-
ties, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,910–11 (2005) (report, order, and notice of proposed rule-
making) [hereinafter DSL Reclassification Report and Order] (reclassifying DSL from a 
telecommunications service to an information service:  “We conclude, consistent with 
Brand X, that such a transmission component is mere ‘telecommunications’ and not a 
‘telecommunications service.’  As stated above, the Act defines telecommunications ser-
vice as ‘the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes 
of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities 
used.’  Thus, whether a telecommunications service is being provided turns on what the 
entity is ‘offering . . . to the public,’ and customers’ understanding of that service.  End 
users subscribing to wireline broadband Internet access service expect to receive (and pay 
for) a finished, functionally integrated service that provides access to the Internet.  End 
users do not expect to receive (or pay for) two distinct services—both Internet access ser-
vice and a distinct transmission service, for example.  Thus, the transmission capability is 
part and parcel of, and integral to, the Internet access service capabilities.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that wireline broadband Internet access service does not include the provi-
sion of a telecommunications service to the end user irrespective of how the service pro-
vider may decide to offer the transmission component to other service providers.”  (foot-
note call numbers omitted)), petition for review denied, Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 
507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 20 See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,501, 11,522–23 (1998) 
(report to Congress) (“The language and legislative history of . . . [the Communications 
Act of 1996] indicate that the drafters . . . regarded telecommunications services and in-
formation services as mutually exclusive categories.”); Communications Assistance for 
Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Services, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,989, 14,996 
(2005) (first report, order, and further notice of proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter 
CALEA Implementation] (“In keeping with the legislative history of the Communications 
Act, the Commission interprets that Act’s definitions of ‘telecommunications service’ and 
‘information service’ to be mutually exclusive.” (citing Federal-State Joint Board on Uni-
versal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. at 11,520, 11,522–23)); see also id. at 14,994–98 (describing this 
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other common carrier regulated industries, such as electricity, water, 
and residential natural gas delivery, many public utilities have created 
separate subsidiaries to engage in unregulated activities. 
The FCC classifies ISPs as information service21 providers, a cate-
gory that emphasizes the content creation, selection, packaging, and 
processing function.22  Absent other considerations, such as exemp-
tion from liability for the content delivered, ISPs can invoke the 
FCC’s information service classification as evidence that the expert 
government agency has recognized the importance in emphasizing 
ISPs’ role in promoting a robust marketplace of ideas, largely free of 
government oversight, including regulation that would have applied 
if the ISPs’ conduit function had predominated. 
The Telecommunications Act of 199623 provides a definition for 
information service substantially different from telecommunications24 
and telecommunications service.25  ISPs qualify for quite limited gov-
 
mutual exclusivity with respect to facilities-based wireline broadband Internet access ser-
vices). 
 21 Information service is defined as “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, 
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information 
via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use 
of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunica-
tions system or the management of a telecommunications service.”  47 U.S.C. § 153(20) 
(2006). 
 22 See DSL Reclassification Report and Order, supra note 19, at 14,864 (“Because wireline 
broadband Internet access service inextricably combines the offering of powerful com-
puter capabilities with telecommunications, we conclude that it falls within the class of 
services identified in the Act as ‘information services.’  The information service classifica-
tion applies regardless of whether subscribers use all of the functions and capabilities 
provided as part of the service (e.g., e-mail or web-hosting), and whether every wireline 
broadband Internet access service provider offers each function and capability that could 
be included in that service.  Indeed, as with cable modem service, an end user of wireline 
broadband Internet access service cannot reach a third party’s web site without access to 
the Domain Naming Service (DNS) capability ‘which (among other things) matches the 
Web site address the end user types into his browser (or “clicks” on with his mouse) with 
the IP address of the Web page’s host server.’  The end user therefore receives more than 
transparent transmission whenever he or she accesses the Internet.” (footnote call num-
bers omitted)). 
 23 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 59 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 24 Telecommunications is defined as “the transmission, between or among points specified 
by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content 
of the information as sent and received.”  47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2006). 
 25 Telecommunications service “means the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly 
to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, 
regardless of the facilities used.”  Id. § 153(46).  The Act defines telecommunications car-
rier as “any provider of telecommunications services, except that such term does not in-
clude aggregators of telecommunications services (as defined in section 226 of this title).  
A telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this chapter 
only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services, except that 
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ernment oversight based largely on the view that government must 
not regulate the content traversing the various networks that make up 
the Internet.  Additionally, Congress and the FCC assume ISPs either 
operate in a robustly competitive marketplace, or alternatively that 
these ventures do not provide essential public utility service necessi-
tating heavy-handed regulatory oversight to ensure fair and nondi-
scriminatory access to these services at reasonable prices.  Having ap-
plied a default least regulated classification to information services, 
the FCC in several instances has had to devise legally suspect justifica-
tions for partial re-regulation on an ad hoc basis.  Examples include 
forcing Voice over the Internet Protocol (“VoIP”)26 service providers 
 
the Commission shall determine whether the provision of fixed and mobile satellite ser-
vice shall be treated as common carriage.”  Id. § 153(44). 
 26 Voice over the Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) refers to the use of the Internet to carry and 
deliver on a real-time immediate basis packets of data that correspond to a voice conver-
sation.  VoIP services range in quality, reliability, and price and can link both computers 
and ordinary telephone handsets.  For technical background on how VoIP works, see Su-
san Spradley & Alan Stoddard, Power Point Presentation at the FCC Office of Engineer-
ing and Technology, Tutorial on Technical Challenges Associated with the Evolution to 
VoIP, (Sept. 22, 2003) available at http://www.fcc.gov/realaudio/presentations/2003/
120103/comments/Nortel-RaymondLStrassburger.ppt, and Intel.com, IP Telephony Ba-
sics (White Paper), http://www.intel.com/network/csp/resources/white_papers/4070
web.htm; see also Stephen E. Blythe, The Regulation of Voice-Over-Internet-Protocol in the Unit-
ed States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 161 (2005) (pre-
dicting that VoIP will become more regulated given the ever-improving quality of service 
and rate of substitution for older technologies); Charles J. Cooper & Brian Stuart Kou-
koutchos, Federalism and the Telephone:  The Case for Preemptive Federal Deregulation in the New 
World of Intermodal Competition, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 293 (2008) (arguing for 
immediate federal preemption of state regulation of local wireline telecommunications 
services); Mark C. Del Bianco, Voices Past:  The Present and Future of VoIP Regulation, 14 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 365 (2006) (offering a comprehensive history of VoIP regula-
tion); R. Alex DuFour, Voice over Internet Protocol:  Ending Uncertainty and Promoting Innova-
tion Through a Regulatory Framework, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 471 (2005) (suggesting 
that VoIP should be regulated through only a skeleton framework until the technology 
evolves to avoid stifling growth); Jerry Ellig & Alastair Walling, Regulatory Status of VoIP in 
the Post-Brand X World, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 89 (2006) (explain-
ing why VoIP should be classified as an “information service” within the federal regulatory 
scheme); Amy L. Leisinger, If It Looks Like a Duck:  The Need for Regulatory Parity in VoIP 
Telephony, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 585 (2006) (positing that regulators must implement a new 
approach to properly govern VoIP technology and recommending Congress revise the 
2004 VoIP Regulatory Freedom Bill as a solution); Linda A. Rushnak, The FCC & VoIP:  A 
Tenuous Regulatory Relationship, J. INTERNET L., Dec. 2007, at 3 (reviewing regulatory histo-
ry of VoIP to illustrate how FCC’s failure to classify VoIP as an information or telecom-
munications service effectively preempts state regulation and allows the FCC to bring spe-
cific portions of VoIP under its exclusive control); Melissa Winberg, Note, Calling All 
Angles:  Perspectives on Regulating Internet Telephony, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 241 (2007) 
(advocating that the FCC’s paramount goals when crafting VoIP rules should be to pro-
mote technological innovation and to replace regulation with competition). 
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to subsidize universal telephone service,27 to cooperate with law en-
forcement officials,28 to adapt service for access by callers with disabil-
ities,29 to mandate service adjustments to support access to emergency 
services,30 and to provide safeguards against abrupt discontinuance, 
reduction, or impairment of service.31  Notwithstanding a preference 
for “bright line” distinctions between service categories, the FCC has 
to confront the reality that convergence blends telecommunications 
and information services, conduit and content, and speakers qualify-
ing for varying degrees of First Amendment protection. 
The telecommunications services versus information services regu-
latory distinction creates a sharp demarcation between extensive and 
nearly non-existent regulation even though the dichotomy may not 
be so clear in practice.32  Ventures classified as information services 
have a financial incentive to secure the same sort of common carrier 
or conduit exemption from content regulation, not as First Amend-
ment speakers, but as neutral conduits operating much like their tel-
ecommunications services counterparts.  To secure safe harbor ex-
 
 27 See Universal Service Contribution Methodology, 21 F.C.C.R. 7518, 7538 (2006) (report, 
order, and notice of proposed rulemaking) (extending § 254(d) permissive authority to 
require interconnected VoIP providers to contribute to the federal universal service fund 
(“USF”)), reh’g denied, vacated in part on other grounds, Vonage Holding Corp. v. FCC, 489 
F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 28 See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Ser-
vices, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,989, 14,991 (2005) (first report, order, and further notice of pro-
posed rulemaking) (concluding that the Communications Assistance for Law Enforce-
ment Act applies to facilities-based broadband Internet access providers and providers of 
interconnected VoIP service), aff’d sub nom., Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226 
(D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 29 See IP-Enabled Services, 22 F.C.C.R. 11,275 (2007) (report and order) (extending the dis-
ability access requirements for telecommunications service providers and equipment 
manufacturers under § 255 of the Communications Act of 1934 to providers of VoIP ser-
vices and to manufacturers of specially designed equipment used to provide those servic-
es), amended by 22 F.C.C.R. 18,319 (waiving for six months the requirements set forth in 
IP-Enabled Services, 22 F.C.C.R. 11,275 (2007), that interconnected VoIP providers must 
transmit 711 calls to an appropriate relay provider). 
 30 See IP-Enabled Services, 20 F.C.C.R. 10,245, 10,246 (2005) (first report, order, and notice 
of proposed rulemaking) (adopting rules requiring providers of interconnected VoIP 
service to supply enhanced 911 capabilities to their customers), aff’d sub nom., Nuvio 
Corp. v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 31 See IP-Enabled Services, 24 F.C.C.R. 6039 (2009) (report and order) (extending “to pro-
viders of interconnected VoIP service the discontinuance obligations that apply to domes-
tic non-dominant telecommunications carriers under section 214 of the Communications 
Act of 1934”). 
 32 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1009 (2005) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is therefore inevitable that customers will regard the compet-
ing cable-modem service as giving them both computing functionality and the physical 
pipe by which that functionality comes to their computer . . . .”). 
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emption from liability for the torts33 and copyright infringement34 
committed by their subscribers, ISPs need to claim that they had 
nothing to do with the creation, editing, monitoring, and packaging 
of the content.  So, on one hand, ISPs provide First Amendment-
protected information that the ISP creates or for which it assumes 
management responsibility, but in many other instances, ISPs dis-
claim any management or creation responsibility as though they op-
erated as the functional equivalent to a common carrier. 
Heretofore, ISPs have successfully manipulated this bi-modal envi-
ronment to their commercial advantage by finding ways to operate 
non-neutral networks without regulatory sanction.  The nature and 
scope of First Amendment analysis has been limited and elementary, 
largely patterned on the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Inter-
net qualifies for maximum protection from government intervention 
by promoting an open and robust marketplace of ideas.35  The Inter-
net certainly does promote openness and accessibility in light of the 
lack of natural resource limitations like radio spectrum.  Yet, ISPs still 
operate the primary gateways providing the first and last link to the 
Internet,36 and increasingly have both the incentive and ability to con-
 
 33 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 34 Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 and 28 U.S.C.), added § 512 to the Copyright 
Act to create four new limitations on liability for copyright infringement by online service 
providers.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).  The limitations are based on the following four 
categories of conduct by a service provider:  1) transitory communications; 2) system 
caching; 3) storage of information on systems or networks at direction of users; and 4) in-
formation location tools.  See id. § 512(a)–(d).  ISPs lose the safe harbor liability exemp-
tion when they have actual knowledge of copyright infringement.  See, e.g., id. 
§ 512(c)(1)(A).  Each limitation completely bars monetary damages and restricts the 
availability of injunctive relief.  See, e.g., id. § 512(a); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, 
Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 
1369 (2004) (“Congress enacted the safe harbors in response to concerns expressed by 
online service providers about their potentially overwhelming liability for copyright in-
fringement committed by their users.”). 
 35 The Supreme Court considers Internet communications as a publishing activity and 
therefore a core element of First Amendment speaker/publisher rights.  See Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) (“Any person or organization with a computer con-
nected to the Internet can ‘publish’ information.”). 
 36 Statistics compiled by the FCC show that cable modem and DSL Internet access serves 
approximately 80% of the market for broadband services exceeding 200 kilobits per 
second.  See INDUS. ANALYSIS AND TECH. DIV., WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, FED. 
COMMC’N COMM’N, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS:  STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 
31, 2008 7–8 (2010), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
296239A1.pdf. 
   Of the 86 million residential high-speed connections at year-end 2008, cable modem 
service represented 46%, DSL service represented 31%, mobile wireless data plans for full 
Internet access represented 18%, fiber optic cable delivered broadband represented 3%, 
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trol access and to manage their networks in non-neutral ways that 
prioritize traffic and impact First Amendment freedoms.37 
Much of the policy debate and scholarly literature on network 
neutrality38 has addressed whether the FCC has statutory authority to 
require ISPs to operate in a nondiscriminatory manner.  Such analy-
 
and all other technologies represented 1%.  Id. at 7.  The FCC has received justly de-
served criticism for the way in which it has compiled statistics of broadband market pene-
tration and the inferences it has derived from the collected data.  The Commission 
frames its statistics with an eye toward overstating the scope of market penetration and 
competition by defining broadband as any service operating at 200 kilobits per second in 
one direction and by counting competitors on the basis of whether one subscriber exists 
within the geographical area represented by a postal zip code.  See Rob Frieden, Lies, 
Damn Lies and Statistics:  Developing a Clearer Assessment of Market Penetration and Broadband 
Competition in the United States, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 100 (2009), 
http://www.vjolt.net/vol14/issue 2/v14i2_100%20-%20Frieden.pdf (comparing and con-
trasting the FCC’s identification of broadband options in the author’s home zip code 
with what actual options the author could identify). 
 37 See Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on the Network Neutrality Debate and the 
Balance of Power Between Intellectual Property Creators and Consumers, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 633 (2008) (concluding that ISPs’ regulatory status as informa-
tion service providers does not provide an absolute exemption from responsibilities to 
examine the content they carry and to provide reasonable safeguards for protecting copy-
rights). 
 38 See Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality:  Understanding Content-Based Promotion of 
Democratic Speech, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 273 (2009); Rob Frieden, Internet 3.0:  Identifying 
Problems and Solutions to the Network Neutrality Debate, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 461 (2007); Rob 
Frieden, Network Neutrality or Bias?—Handicapping the Odds for a Tiered and Branded Internet, 
29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171 (2007); Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, 
Transcending Net Neutrality:  Ten Steps Toward an Open Internet, J. INTERNET L., Dec. 2008, at 
1; Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Broadband Internet Access, 22 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 1 (2008); Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network:  How the Internet Holds Itself 
Together, and the Forces Tearing it Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343 (2008); Christopher S. 
Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179; see also Bar-
bara A. Cherry, Misusing Network Neutrality to Eliminate Common Carriage Threatens Free 
Speech and the Postal System, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 483 (2006); Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara 
van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics of an Information Superhighway:  A Reply to 
Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383 (2007); Bill D. Herman, Opening Bottlenecks:  On Behalf 
of Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 103 (2006); Mark A. Lemley & Law-
rence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:  Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband 
Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001); J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network 
Neutrality Regulation of the Internet, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 349 (2006); Adam Thier-
er, Are “Dumb Pipe” Mandates Smart Public Policy?  Vertical Integration, Net Neutrality, and the 
Network Layers Model, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 275 (2005); Barbara van Schewick, 
Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 329 (2007); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. 
& HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of 
Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006); Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Net-
work Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition?  A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 (2004); Craig McTaggart, Was The Internet Ever Neu-
tral?,  Presentation at the George Mason University School of Law 34th Research Confe-
rence on Communication, Information and Internet Policy (Sept. 30, 2006), available at 
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2006/593/mctaggart-tprc06rev.pdf. 
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sis largely focuses on questions about jurisdiction, the scope of lawful 
regulation, and the balance of power between stakeholders, generally 
adverse to government oversight, and government agencies, appar-
ently willing to overcome the same inclination.  The public policy de-
bate primarily considers micro-level issues, without much considera-
tion of broader concerns, such as First Amendment values and whose 
First Amendment interests to champion when conflicts arise.39 
When ISPs operate as non-neutral content creators and managers, 
First Amendment analysis becomes more complex because divergent 
interests exist between the ISP, its end users downstream, and con-
tent providers upstream40 that may partner or compete with the ISP.  
In light of such divergent interests, courts may have to reach conclu-
sions about whose First Amendment rights predominate.  In broad-
casting, the Supreme Court determined that end users’ listen-
er/viewer rights predominated in light of broadcasters’ use of scarce 
public spectrum.  While the Internet has no equivalent natural re-
source scarcity, prioritization of First Amendment rights may still 
have to occur much like what happened when the Supreme Court in 
the Turner Broadcasting System cases evaluated the rights of cable oper-
ators vis-à-vis their subscribers and competing content providers, in-
cluding television broadcasters who secured the congressionally 
mandated right to demand that cable operators must carry broadcast 
channels. 
While professing to support marketplace resource allocation and 
a regulation-free Internet, the FCC has selectively imposed regulatory 
 
 39 Scholarship that addresses network neutrality in the context of the First Amendment in-
cludes:  Ammori, supra note 38; Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 
36 PEPP. L. REV. 427 (2009); Brett M. Frischmann, Speech, Spillovers and the First Amendment, 
2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 301; Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy and Free Speech:  The First 
Amendment at War with Itself, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1211 (2007); Randolph J. May, Net Neu-
trality Mandates:  Neutering the First Amendment in the Digital Age, 3 I/S:  J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
FOR INFO. SOC’Y. 197 (2007); Jennifer L. Newman, Keeping the Internet Neutral:  Net Neutrali-
ty and Its Role in Protecting Political Expression on the Internet, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J., 153 (2008); Anthony E. Varona, Toward a Broadband Public Interest Standard, 61 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2009); Moran Yemini, Mandated Network Neutrality and the First Amend-
ment:  Lessons from Turner and a New Approach, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2008), 
http://www.vjolt.net/vol13/issue1/v13i1_a1-Yemini.pdf. 
 40 A complete Internet routing involves several interconnected links.  End users access the 
Internet via a narrowband connection such as dial-up telephone service, or via broadband 
service provided through cable modems, DSL, satellites or terrestrial wireless networks.  
The first and last refers to the networks used to originate and terminate Internet traffic.  
Because the content desired by subscribers is stored in servers located in geographically 
diverse areas, the company providing the first and last links must interconnect with net-
works operated by other ventures.  The end user’s first and last link provider operates 
midway between its subscribers downstream and other networks and content sources lo-
cated upstream. 
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compliance duties on ISPs despite their classification as largely unre-
gulated information service providers.41  Such regulation can tilt the 
competitive playing field by imposing more regulatory cost on some 
operators vis-à-vis competitors.  ISP regulation also has the potential 
for favoring some speakers to the detriment (or subordination) of 
others, by affecting ISPs’ content packaging decisions. 
The FCC has summarily dismissed any concerns that the Commis-
sion’s regulatory regime inhibits First Amendment protected expres-
sion.  The Commission avoids any consideration of the First Amend-
ment and a comparative assessment of speaker rights by 
concentrating on the conduit function and emphasizing that ISPs use 
their conduits to provide information services.42 
Additionally, the Commission relentlessly underscores how the 
ISP marketplace evidences robust competition and successful market 
 
 41 While acknowledging the Internet’s importance and accessibility, the FCC held that it 
could regulate ISPs based directly on legislative mandates to improve accessibility, and 
indirectly using “ancillary jurisdiction” to promote the public interest: 
[A]s muddy as the legal waters may seem to Comcast, we think our ancillary au-
thority to enforce federal policy is quite clear.  Peer-to-peer TCP connections pro-
vided through Comcast’s broadband Internet access service are undoubtedly a 
form of “communication by wire,” so the subject matter at issue here clearly falls 
within the Commission’s general jurisdictional grant under Title I.  And though 
our exercise of authority must be “reasonably ancillary to the effective perfor-
mance” of the Commission’s responsibility for “something,” first and foremost, the 
“something” Comcast is looking for is right in the Act itself—it is the national In-
ternet policy enshrined in section 230(b) of the Act. 
  Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,035 (2008) (memorandum opinion and order) 
(footnote call numbers omitted) (asserting jurisdiction to enforce regulatory policies 
over ISPs and to sanction Comcast for violating such policies when the company blocked 
traffic in the absence of network congestion and credible network management justifica-
tions), rev’d, Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., No. 08-1291, slip op. (D.C. Cir. April 6, 2010), 
available at http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/201004/08-1291-
1238302.pdf. 
 42 For example, in sanctioning Comcast for its interference with subscribers’ traffic, the FCC 
emphasized that it could regulate how ISPs prioritize or degrade traffic and in turn the 
flow of content absent reasonable ISP network management objectives.  Such regulation 
“[u]nder these circumstances . . . do[es] not raise First Amendment concerns.”  Id. at 
13,053 n.203. 
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penetration,43 despite credible statistics that challenge this assump-
tion.44 
Technological and marketplace convergence creates the ability 
and incentive for ISPs to use their telecommunications networks as 
conduits for information services as well as functional equivalents to 
broadcast television, cable television, and telephony.45  ISPs operate as 
publishers, editors, content aggregators, and non-neutral conduit 
providers.  Accordingly, no single First Amendment media model 
(print, broadcast, cable television, and telephone), or legislative defi-
 
 43 The FCC has concluded “that advanced telecommunications capability [a term contained 
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that the FCC uses to identify broadband access] is 
being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion.”  Inquiry Concerning 
the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans, 23 
F.C.C.R. 9615 (2008) (fifth report); see Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. at 13028, 13085 (“Pre-
sently, we are benefiting from over $100 billion in broadband investment, robust industry 
competition and cooperation and unprecedented consumer options in this dynamic mul-
ti-platform marketplace.”). 
 44 See ROBERT D. ATKINSON, DANIEL K. CORREA & JULIE A. HEDLUND, EXPLAINING 
INTERNATIONAL BROADBAND LEADERSHIP: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2008) 
http://www.itif.org/files/2008BBExecutiveSummary.pdf; DANIEL K. CORREA, THE INFO. 
TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., ASSESSING BROADBAND IN AMERICA:  OECD AND ITIF 
BROADBAND RANKINGS (2007), http://www.itif.org/files/BroadbandRankings.pdf; Direc-
torate for Science, Technology and Industry, Organization for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development, OECD Broadband Portal (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/
document/54/0,3343,en_2649_33703_38690102_1_1_1_1,00.html; Directorate for 
Science, Technology and Industry, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Devel-
opment, OECD Broadband Subscribers per 100 Inhabitants by Technology (June 2009) 
(Jan. 19, 2010), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/39/38449070.xls; THE INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION FOUNDATION, 2008 ITIF BROADBAND RANKINGS 1 (2008), 
http://www.itif.org/files/2008BBRankings.pdf; International Telecommunication Un-
ion, ITU Broadband Statistics for 1 January 2006 (May 22, 2006), http://www.
itu.int/osg/spu/newslog/ITU+Broadband+Statistics+For+1+January+2006.aspx; TAYLOR 
REYNOLDS & SACHA WUNSCH-VINCENT, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, BROADBAND GROWTH AND POLICIES IN OECD COUNTRIES (2008), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/57/40629067.pdf; S. DEREK TURNER, FREE PRESS, 
BROADBAND REALITY CHECK II:  THE TRUTH BEHIND AMERICA’S DIGITAL DECLINE (2006), 
http://www.freepress.net/files/broadband_report.pdf; S. DEREK TURNER, FREE PRESS, 
‘SHOOTING THE MESSENGER’ MYTH VS. REALITY:  U.S. BROADBAND POLICY AND 
INTERNATIONAL BROADBAND RANKINGS (2007), http://www.freepress.net/
files/shooting_the_messenger.pdf. 
 45 Internet Protocol Television (“IPTV”) offers access to video programming via the Inter-
net.  Users can download files that contain such content for subsequent viewing.  Alterna-
tively, they can receive an online “stream” of video packets corresponding to an existing 
file or a simulcast of “live” programming.  Voice over the Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) of-
fers voice communications capabilities, much like ordinary telephone service, using the 
packet-switched Internet, for all or part of the link between call originator and call reci-
pient.  VoIP calls originating or terminating over the standard dial-up telephone network 
require conversion from or to the standard telephone network’s architecture that creates 
a dedicated “circuit-switched” link, as opposed to the ad hoc, “best efforts” packet-
switching used in the Internet. 
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nition of service (telecommunications, telecommunications service, 
and information service) covers every ISP activity.  Despite the lack of 
a single applicable model and the fact that ISPs provide different ser-
vices, the FCC continues to apply a single, least-regulated classifica-
tion to convergent services.  The inclination to classify everything that 
an ISP does into one category promotes administrative convenience 
but ignores the complex nature of ISP services and the potential for 
ISPs to harm individuals, groups, and First Amendment values. 
For example, § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which 
partially amended the Communications Act of 1934,46 offers ISPs an 
opportunity to secure exemption from liability for transmitting con-
tent that has triggered a variety of quite serious personal and public 
harms including defamation,47 child molestation,48 and civil rights vi-
olations.49  The exemption applies whenever an ISP eschews content 
creation and management functions and operates much like a com-
mon carrier.50  ISPs also qualify for a safe harbor exemption from 
secondary liability for copyright infringement.51  Additionally, the 
FCC’s application of an omnibus information service classification 
 
 46 Communications Decency Act of 1996 § 509, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). 
 47 See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc. 129 F.3d 327, 328–29 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Section 
230 . . . plainly immunizes computer service providers like AOL from liability [for defa-
mation] for information that originates with third parties.”); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 
F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (“[T]he statutory language is clear:  AOL is immune from 
suit . . . .”). 
 48 Doe v. MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849–50 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (extending the immunity 
granted by the CDA to cases of child molestation). 
 49 Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 
671–72 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the web site operator did not manage the creation 
of content expressing discriminatory roommate preferences); cf. Fair Hous. Council of 
San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1161–62, 1175 (9th Cir. 
2008) (holding that § 230 did not insulate a web site operator that actively assisted in the 
creation of content identifying discriminatory intentions). 
 50 For background on the § 230 safe harbor, see Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibili-
ty:  Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986 (2008); see also An-
thony Ciolli, Chilling Effects:  The Communications Decency Act and the Online Marketplace of 
Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137 (2008); Amanda Groover Hyland, The Taming of the Internet:  
A New Approach to Third-Party Internet Defamation, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 79 
(2008); Tara E. Lynch, Comment, Good Samaritan or Defamation Defender?  Amending the 
Communications Decency Act to Correct the Misnomer of Section 230 . . . Without Expanding ISP 
Liability, 19 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1 (2008), available at http://sstlr.syr.edu/wp-
content/uploads/lynch-final-version.pdf; Cecilia Ziniti, The Optimal Liability System for On-
line Service Providers:  How Zeran v. America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583 (2008).  See generally Karen Horowitz, When Is § 230 Immunity 
Lost?:  The Transformation From Website Owner to Information Content Provider, 3 SHIDLER J. L. 
COM. & TECH. 14 (2007), available at http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu
/Vol4/a08Horowitz.html; Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101 (2007). 
 51 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 § 202(a), 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
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enables ISPs to engage in some types of price and quality of service 
discrimination that network neutrality advocates worry will distort a 
free marketplace of ideas. 
II.  ISPS HAVE THE MOTIVATION AND MEANS TO OPERATE AS BOTH 
CONTENT MANAGERS AND NEUTRAL CONDUITS 
Innovations in information, communications, and entertainment 
(“ICE”) technologies now make it possible for ventures to provide a 
wide array of services that can exploit the efficiencies accruing from 
digitization,52 the versatility of the Internet and its operating proto-
cols,53 and declining unit costs.  Key words such as faster, better, smar-
ter, cheaper, and more convenient describe how digital networks of-
fer a better value proposition for consumers.  For example, 
digitization supports speedy delivery, duplication, and processing of 
ICE content.  The Transmission Control Protocol and Internet ad-
 
 52 Humans speak, hear, and see in an analog format where content modulates over a carri-
er.  We speak by vibrating the larynx and projecting modulating frequencies using our 
lungs.  We hear as sound vibrations stimulate the ear drum which sends signals to the 
brain.  Our eyes receive visible light.  Computers and other digital devices communicate 
and process information formatted into a series of bits.  Digitization offers a comparative-
ly more efficient medium for transmitting, processing, and storing content.  See ABBY 
SMITH, COUNCIL ON LIBRARY AND INFORMATION RESOURCES, WHY DIGITIZE?, at iv (1999), 
http://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/pub80-smith/pub80.pdf (“Digitization has proven to 
be possible for nearly every format and medium presently held by libraries, from maps to 
manuscripts, and moving images to musical recordings.  The use of hardware and soft-
ware for capturing an item and converting it into bits and bytes, matched by a quickly de-
veloping set of practices for describing and retrieving digital objects, is giving form to the 
talk of a ‘library without walls.’”). 
 53 See Konrad L. Trope, Voice over Internet Protocol:  The Revolution in America’s Telecommunica-
tions Infrastructure, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW, Dec. 2005, at 1, 4 (“The Internet is a vast 
network of individual computers and computer networks that communicate with each 
other using the same communications language, Transmission Control Protocol/Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP).  The Internet consists of approximately more than 100 million com-
puters around the world using TCP/IP protocols.  Along with the development of 
TCP/IP, the open network architecture of the Internet has the following characteristics 
or parameters:  1. Each distinct network stands on its own with its own specific environ-
ment and user requirements, notwithstanding the use of TCP/IP to connect to other 
parts of the Internet.  Communications are not directed in a unilateral fashion.  Rather, 
communications are routed throughout the Internet on a best efforts basis in which some 
packets of information may go through one series of computer networks and other pack-
ets of information go through a different permutation or combination of computer net-
works, with all of these information packets eventually arriving at their intended destina-
tion.  2. Black boxes, for lack of a better term, connect the various networks; these boxes 
are called ‘gateways’ and ‘routers.’  The gateways and routers do not retain information 
but merely provide access and flow for the packets being transmitted.  3. There is no 
global control of the Internet.” (footnote call numbers omitted)). 
June 2010] INVOKING AND AVOIDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1297 
 
dressing protocols, coupled with packet-switching technology,54 help 
make the Internet a centralized medium for the delivery of all sorts of 
ICE content that previously traversed separate networks.  Digital 
technologies, including the Internet, help operators accrue operating 
efficiency gains from scale,55 scope,56 and positive network effects.57 
As technologies converge, ventures providing ICE services identify 
new opportunities to expand their array of offered services into a 
“triple play”58 or “quadruple play”59 bundle that combines telecom-
munications services, such as wired and wireless telephony; video ser-
vices, such as cable television and Internet Protocol Television 
 
 54 See Susan Landau, National Security on the Line, 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 409, 424 
(2006) (“In particular, the routes packets traverse is [sic] dynamically determined 
through addresses carried in the packets themselves.  If a particular communication link 
is busy, the packet will be routed through a less-congested path.  In theory—this occurs 
much less often in practice—each packet of a communication may travel a different route 
to its destination.”). 
 55 See MEDIA ECONOMICS:  THEORY AND PRACTICE 286 (Alison Alexander et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2004) (“Declining levels of average cost accompanying greater expansion of product out-
put and optimal use of plant and equipment.  Cost advantages associated with the in-
creasing size of firms.”); see also Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of In-
cumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 18 F.C.C.R. 16,978, 17,029 n.245 (2003) (report, 
order on remand, and further notice of proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter Review of 
Section 251] (“Scale economies refer to lower average costs from producing a larger 
quantity of output.  A more technical definition is that economies of scale exist at a par-
ticular range of output when the long run average total cost decreases as output expands.  
Scale economies can be a barrier to entry if entrants are likely to acquire fewer customers 
and sell less output than the incumbent, and the resulting higher average cost for the en-
trants makes it difficult for them to compete with the incumbent, particularly if retail 
prices are close to the incumbent’s average cost.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 56 Review of Section 251, supra note 55, at 17,029 n.246 (“Economies of scope exist when 
one firm can produce two or more products at a lower total cost than if each product 
were produced separately by different firms.  Scope economies can be a barrier to entry if 
entrants are unable to produce and sell all of the products the incumbent produces, and 
the resulting higher cost makes it unprofitable to enter the market.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
 57 See id. at 17,030 n.253 (“Network externalities (or network effects) exist if the benefit that 
a consumer derives from purchasing a good is affected by whether others take the same 
service.  Consumers then derive greater benefit from purchasing services from larger 
networks.  Thus, larger networks gain a competitive advantage over small networks, which 
allows them to charge higher prices.  In telecommunications networks, network externali-
ties refer to the greater value of a network in which all users can communicate with all 
other users.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 58 See Exclusive Service Contracts for Provision of Video Services in Multiple Dwelling Units 
and Other Real Estate Developments, 22 F.C.C.R. 5935, 5938 (2007) (notice of proposed 
rulemaking) (noting entrance of “traditional phone companies that are primed to offer a 
‘triple play’ of voice, high-speed Internet access, and video services over their respective 
networks” to the market). 
 59 The quadruple play refers to the combination of “video, broadband Internet access, VoIP 
and wireless service.”  AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation Application for Transfer of 
Control, 22 F.C.C.R. 5662, 5736 (2007) (memorandum and order). 
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(“IPTV”); and information services, such as Internet access.  This 
bundling of services results in a convergence of previously discrete 
and separate markets, all but eliminating any distinction between 
ventures that provide content–delivery, conduit services and ventures 
that create, package, manage, format, and edit the content that tra-
verses telecommunications conduits. 
A.  Component Parts of the World Wide Web 
ISPs can operate as both content provider/manager and conduit 
because of the technical architecture of the Internet that makes it 
possible for a single venture to pursue multiple lines of business.  
ISP’s most obvious commercial venture involves the provision of 
broadband links between individual subscribers and what is common-
ly referred to as the Internet cloud60 within which the ISP intercon-
nects with other ISPs’ networks to provide subscribers with access to 
content not housed on the “home” ISP’s facilities, and to provide 
links to other Internet subscribers.  ISPs provide the first and last 
links to subscribers via wireline facilities operated by incumbent cable 
television and telephone companies offering cable modem61 and Dig-
ital Subscriber Line62 services, respectively.  Other ISP-delivered links 
 
 60 The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make up the 
Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these networks and the content 
available via these networks. 
 61 See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facili-
ties, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4818–19 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed rule-
making), aff’d in part and vacated in part, Brand X Internet Servs. v. F.C.C., 345 F.3d 1120 
(9th Cir. 2003), rev’d and remanded, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 62 See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to 
All Americans, 23 F.C.C.R. 9615, 9620 (2008) (fifth report) (“Local telephone carriers 
primarily use digital subscriber line (DSL) service offerings to provide consumers with 
broadband services where they have not deployed fiber technologies.”).  Digital Subscrib-
er Links provide Internet access via the copper wires initially used solely to provide nar-
rowband telephone service.  Telephone companies retrofit the wires to provide medium 
speed broadband services by expanding the available bandwidth by about 1500 kilohertz.  
The FCC provides the following definition: 
Digital Subscriber Line is a technology for bringing high-speed and high-
bandwidth, which is directly proportional to the amount of data transmitted or re-
ceived per unit time, information to homes and small businesses over ordinary 
copper telephone lines already installed in hundreds of millions of homes and 
businesses worldwide.  With DSL, consumers and businesses take advantage of hav-
ing a dedicated, always-on connection to the Internet. 
Federal Communications Commission, FCC Consumer Facts:  Broadband Access for 
Consumers, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/dsl2.html (last visited May 11, 
2010). 
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to end users include wireless options provided by terrestrial63 and sa-
tellite networks.64 
Additionally, most ISPs offer their subscribers some content that 
appears on the ISP’s “home page,” the first screen generated when 
subscribers log on and initiate an Internet access session.  Content, 
which appears on the ISP’s home and subsequent pages, is located 
either on the premises of the ISP, usually at a computerized storage 
device, commonly known as a server, or at servers of other ventures, 
including other ISPs located elsewhere.  In most instances, an ISP can 
deliver in-house content using the ISP’s leased or owned telecommu-
nications lines, but for content generated by affiliated or unaffiliated 
ventures located elsewhere, the ISP must interconnect with other 
ISPs to secure access via their networks that eventually reach the 
source of content and establish a complete link.65  Unaffiliated ISPs 
agree to reciprocal traffic routing duties, commonly referred to as 
peering,66 so that their subscribers can secure access to all sources of 
content and all subscribers, regardless of who provides the first and 
last link to originate and terminate their Internet traffic.  Through 
 
 63 See Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wire-
less Networks, 22 F.C.C.R. 5901, 5901 n.1 (2007) (declaratory ruling) (addressing terre-
strial wireless broadband and not satellite broadband access). 
 64 See WildBlue, About WildBlue High-Speed Internet via Satellite, 
http://www.wildblue.com/aboutWildblue/index.jsp (last visited May 11, 2010) 
(“WildBlue offers you high-speed Internet access via satellite to almost every corner of the 
U.S.!”). 
 65 See Nicholas P. Dickerson, Comment, What Makes the Internet So Special?  And Why, Where, 
How, and by Whom Should Its Content Be Regulated?, 46 HOUS. L. Rev. 61, 69 (2009) (“In very 
general terms, the Internet consists of four primary components:  the end user, the In-
ternet service or access provider, the host or content provider, and the communication 
networks linking the first three.  The Internet itself is actually a cooperative collaboration 
of thousands of individual networks, most of which are privately managed and funded by 
companies such as ISPs.  Private companies are also largely responsible for building and 
selling access to Internet backbones, the high-capacity lines that make up the physical in-
frastructure of the Internet through which information flows.” (footnote call numbers 
omitted)). 
 66 See Bringing Broadband to Rural America:  Report on a Rural Broadband Strategy, 24 
F.C.C.R. 12,791, 12,828 (2009) (“Rural broadband networks are fundamentally similar to 
broadband networks in other areas in that, in order to have broadband access to the In-
ternet, they must include local access, or last-mile, broadband access to the end user and 
backhaul, or middle-mile, capabilities to an available Internet peering point.  The last-
mile network connects residential and business end users to a local ISP.  In this configu-
ration, the middle-mile or backhaul component connects the local ISP to an Internet 
peering point or node.  In rural settings, either or both of these components may not 
support robust broadband connectivity.  The choice of any local access or ‘middle-mile’ 
technology in a rural setting must take into account factors including desired capacity, 
cost, reach, and the need for additional resources like radiofrequency spectrum, electron-
ic equipment, access to poles and rights of way, and power.” (footnote call numbers omit-
ted)). 
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these reciprocal traffic routing agreements, ISPs generally can offer 
their subscribers access to every source of content and to every indi-
vidual subscriber.  The characterization of the Internet as a “network 
of networks”67 refers to the seamless integration of the many unaffi-
liated networks providing content delivery services. 
As a network of networks, the Internet combines content and 
conduit, and subscribers generally do not distinguish between the 
ISP’s conduit function and its content creation and management ac-
tivities.  The monthly subscription paid by subscribers is considered 
Internet access, but the fee combines payment for the first and last 
mile link to the Internet cloud, other links farther upstream from the 
home ISP’s facilities, and all content for which no additional fees are 
charged. 
Because of the close integration of content and conduit, ISPs in-
creasingly have incentives and opportunities to provide any of the 
component elements of so-called Internet access in a non-neutral 
manner.  Customer-tiering68 refers to diversification of pricing and 
quality of service options available to subscribers of the first and last 
link in Internet access.  ISPs increasingly seek to differentiate services 
and charge different rates as a function of the content delivery speed 
(bit rate) offered, as well as the amount of content (throughput) de-
livered in a month.  The current predominant pricing model offers 
unmetered, flat-rate (“all-you-can-eat”)69 Internet access that can sti-
 
 67 See James B. Speta, FCC Authority to Regulate the Internet:  Creating It and Limiting It, 35 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 15, 31 (2003) (“The Internet is a network of networks, and its utility largely 
depends on the principle of universal interconnectivity.  This is true both as a technical 
and as an economic matter.”). 
 68 See Network Neutrality:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 109th Cong. 
(2006) [hereinafter Lessig Testimony] (statement of Professor Lawrence Lessig, Professor 
of Law, Stanford Law School), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/lessig-
020706.pdf. 
 69 See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Bundles of Joy:  The Ubiquity and Efficiency of 
Bundles in New Technology Markets, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 4–5 (2009) (“Go into an 
all-you-can-eat buffet restaurant and what you are offered is neither a tie nor a fixed bun-
dle.  The food items are consumed in variable proportions, but there is no tie in the 
normal sense.  You are given access to an unlimited bundle of goods (from the point of 
view of an ordinary consumer), and what is consumed varies for each consumer.  The 
price that you pay is an entrance fee and is not a function of use—customers can eat as 
much or as little as they want.  We refer to this as all-you-can-eat pricing.  Cable TV, which 
provides only ‘packages’ of numerous channels, is an example of this type of pricing as 
opposed to a traditional bundle.  No individual can watch all of the programs on all of 
the channels but they can watch as much as they wish of any channel in the bundle for 
one flat fee (per month).”). 
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mulate overconsumption and impose higher costs on low volume us-
ers.70 
Access-tiering71 refers to similar diversification upstream from the 
home ISP, a process more likely to trigger network neutrality con-
cerns in light of the inability of subscribers to know how and why 
their service, by type of traffic and even by source of content, is expe-
dited, delayed, or rendered inoperative.72  Advocates for network neu-
trality argue that ISPs can prioritize traffic, even to the point of creat-
ing artificial congestion, with an eye toward favoring the traffic of 
some content providers, including the ISP and its affiliates, to the fi-
nancial detriment of others.73  Unlike legitimate technical network 
management functions, operating a biased, non-neutral network 
could have a direct, adverse, and unnecessary impact on the market-
place of ideas by favoring certain types of content and speakers who 
pay for the privilege, or have an affiliation with the ISP. 
Because ISPs must constantly upgrade their networks to handle 
ever increasing content transmission delivery requirements of sub-
scribers, ISPs consider it essential that they find new ways to recoup 
infrastructure costs.  When ISPs deviate from a single, “plain vanilla” 
all-you-can-eat service plan, they can customize existing services and 
 
 70 See Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of An Antitrust Dispute:  An Institutional 
Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 19, 29 (2009) 
(“Most Internet access plans today include ‘all you can eat’ connectivity; consumers pay a 
flat fee for a particular level of bandwidth but do not generally pay any incremental per-
bit price for causing extra data traffic to cross shared network facilities.  They have tradi-
tionally paid the same for a 3 Mbps connection whether they have used that connection 
once a day, to download a static webpage, or all day, to download and upload high-
definition video files.  There have thus been no price signals to deter a minority of sub-
scribers from overconsuming network capacity at the expense of the majority.”). 
 71 See Lessig Testimony, supra note 68, at 2 n.2 (describing access-tiering as “any policy by 
network owners to condition content or service providers’ right to provide content or ser-
vice to the network upon the payment of some fee”). 
 72 See Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,051 (2008) (memorandum opinion and order) 
(“Furthermore, Comcast’s interruption of customers’ uploads by definition interferes 
with Internet users’ downloads since ‘any end-point that is uploading has a correspond-
ing end-point that is downloading.’  Also, because Comcast’s method—sending RST 
packets to both sides of a TCP connection—is the same method computers connected via 
TCP use to communicate with each other, a customer has no way of knowing when Com-
cast (rather than its peer) terminates a connection.” (footnote call numbers omitted)), 
rev’d, Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., No. 08-1291, slip op. (D.C. Cir. April 6, 2010), available at 
http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/201004/08-1291-1238302.pdf. 
 73 See Balkin, supra note 39, at 431 (“[M]ost network discrimination will be for economic 
reasons—to favor business partners and protect incumbent business models.”); Frisch-
mann & van Schewick, supra note 38, at 387–88 (noting that “[n]etwork neutrality pro-
ponents are concerned that network providers may use the new technology to exclude 
applications and content from their networks or discriminate against them,” resulting in  
a significant reduction in the Internet’s value for society). 
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create new ones that can better serve specific customer requirements 
and in turn generate higher revenues.  Customers and content pro-
viders upstream, benefitting from neutral, “best efforts” Internet 
access, may object to many types of service diversification because it 
typically results in higher costs, e.g., a rate hike for heavy volume us-
ers and selective surcharges for content providers who secure priority 
treatment of their traffic. 
B.  Convergence Triggers a Regulatory Quandary 
Technological and marketplace convergence presents a quandary 
for regulators.  On one hand, innovations may lower barriers to mar-
ket entry and support more robust competition.  Under this scenario, 
regulators should reduce the scope and nature of their oversight in 
light of greater opportunities for ICE ventures to self-regulate, and 
for marketplace forces to prevent price gouging and other unfair 
trade practices that could harm consumers.  On the other hand, con-
vergence may promote market consolidation and concentration of 
ownership and control as ventures seek to accrue scale and scope 
economies, as well as positive networking externalities.  If competi-
tion wanes and does not match the expectations used to justify dere-
gulation, convergence may increase market power possessed by a 
small number of firms and potentially constrain access and a compet-
itive marketplace of ideas.  In both scenarios, regulators also have to 
confront the consequences of having to use service definitions that 
contemplate discrete and mutually exclusive markets.  In the United 
States, the basic telecommunications law contains language first 
drafted in the early 1900s,74 with the last major amendments occur-
ring in 1996.75 
The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, establishes service 
definitions for broadcasting,76 cable television,77 telecommunica-
tions,78 telecommunications service,79 and information service80 mod-
els.  Using these limited options, the FCC has shoehorned everything 
 
 74 See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 151–614 (2006)).  This law updated and expanded provisions contained in the Radio 
Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, the Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302, and the 
Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539. 
 75 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. 
 76 47 U.S.C. §§ 301–399(b) (2006) (provisions relating to radio). 
 77 Id. §§ 521–549 (cable communications). 
 78 Id. § 153(43) (general provisions). 
 79 Id. § 153(46) (general provisions). 
 80 Id. §§ 151–161 (general provisions); see, e.g., id. § 153(20) (defining information service). 
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an ISP does into the information services classification.  Having de-
cided that ISPs need not separate content delivery telecommunica-
tions services from content creation and management services, the 
Commission faces a growing problem when convergence makes it 
possible for an ISP to offer an array of services that arguably fit within 
two or more of the service definitions contained in the Communica-
tions Act.  Absent structural separation, which would enable the FCC 
to apply a single regulatory regime and operating service definition 
to an ISP’s telecommunications, information, and video service ven-
tures, the Commission faces challenges of whether and how to make 
one service definition expand and fit all of an ISP’s bundled services. 
The FCC has opted to avoid specifying what service definition ap-
plies, e.g., for VoIP telephone services81 and IPTV.  Additionally, the 
FCC has stretched the information service definition to cover, in a 
consistent manner,82 all ISP services for which the Commission has 
determined that it must make a classification, e.g., to apply the lightly 
regulated information service classification to cable modem,83 DSL,84 
broadband over powerline,85 and wireless broadband86 services. 
 
 81 In Pulver.com’s Free World Dialup, the FCC stated that computer-to-computer voice com-
munications, which do not access conventional telephone service lines, constituted an in-
formation service.  “We conclude that FWD is an information service because FWD offers 
‘a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utiliz-
ing, or making available information via telecommunications.’”  19 F.C.C.R. 3307, 3313 
(2004) (memorandum opinion and order). 
   In Vonage Holdings Corp., the FCC preempted the states from regulating VoIP services 
on the grounds that VoIP services cannot segment into intrastate and interstate compo-
nents.  The FCC concluded that any state regulation would frustrate federal policy, but 
while asserting jurisdiction the Commission expressly declined to state whether such ser-
vices constituted an information or telecommunications service.  19 F.C.C.R. 22,404, 
22,411 (2004) (memorandum opinion and order) (“We find that the characteristics of 
DigitalVoice preclude any practical identification of, and separation into, interstate and 
intrastate communications for purposes of effectuating a dual federal/state regulatory 
scheme, and that permitting Minnesota’s regulations would thwart federal law and policy.  
We reach this decision irrespective of the definitional classification of DigitalVoice under 
the Act, i.e., telecommunications or information service, a determination we do not reach 
in this Order.”). 
 82 See Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Informa-
tion Service, 21 F.C.C.R. 13,281, 13,281–82 (2006) (memorandum and order) (establish-
ing a “goal of developing a consistent regulatory framework across broadband platforms 
by regulating like services in a similar manner”). 
 83 High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 
(2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed rulemaking), aff’d sub nom., Nat’l Ca-
ble & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 84 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 
F.C.C.R. 14,853 (2005) (report, order, and notice of proposed rulemaking), aff’d sub 
nom., Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 85 See Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Informa-
tion Service, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13,281; see also Annual Assessment of the Status of Competi-
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Using a strategy of avoiding having to make a service classification, 
or expanding and applying the information services classification, of-
fers one point of clarity:  ISPs do not operate as conventional tele-
communications common carriers, subject to nondiscrimination and 
other forms of economic regulation established in Title II of the 
Communications Act.87  In other words, by not applying Title II re-
quirements to ISPs, the FCC in effect has shifted its regulatory focus 
away from ISPs’ conduit function and onto their content creation 
and management function.  In eliminating its Title II regulatory op-
tion, the FCC has emphasized the difference between ventures that 
provide telecommunications as part of an information service versus 
ventures that offer telecommunications services to end users.88  In the 
 
tion in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, 20 F.C.C.R. 2755, 2827 (2005) 
(“Several utility companies have been experimenting with a technology called ‘broad-
band-over-power-line (BPL)’ service, which uses power lines to carry high-speed data sig-
nals the ‘last mile’ to the home.  BPL uses fiber optic lines or another traditional medium 
to deliver data to the power line.  While the primary objective of this technology is to pro-
vide high-speed Internet access services, some companies have expressed plans to offer 
video streaming services, but not traditional video services.” (footnote call numbers omit-
ted)). 
 86 Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireless 
Networks, 22 F.C.C.R. 5901 (2007) (declaratory ruling). 
 87 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–276 (2006) (setting forth the duties and operations of common car-
riers).  But even this conclusion may not persist.  In response to the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversal of the FCC’s decision to sanction Comcast for meddling with subscrib-
ers’ traffic even in the absence of network congestion, the Commission may try to apply 
selected portions of Title II requirements to the access conduit function provided by ISPs.  
See Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, The Third 
Way:  A Narrowly Tailored Broadband Framework (May 6, 2010) available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297944A1.pdf (rejecting a 
renewed attempt to find a way to extend Title I ancillary jurisdiction or reclassifying all 
aspects of Internet access as a telecommunications service); Austin Schlick, General 
Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, A Third-Way Legal Framework for Ad-
dressing the Comcast Dilemma (May 6, 2010) available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297945A1.pdf (providing le-
gal rationale for narrow application of selected sections of Title II regulatory authority 
over Internet access). 
 88 See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 
20 F.C.C.R. at 14,910 (“We conclude, consistent with Brand X, that such a transmission 
component [in a DSL service] is mere ‘telecommunications’ and not a ‘telecommunica-
tions service.’  As stated above, the Act defines telecommunications service as ‘the offering 
of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be ef-
fectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used.’  Thus, whether a 
telecommunications service is being provided turns on what the entity is ‘offering . . . to 
the public,’ and customers’ understanding of that service.  End users subscribing to wire-
line broadband Internet access service expect to receive (and pay for) a finished, func-
tionally integrated service that provides access to the Internet.  End users do not expect 
to receive (or pay for) two distinct services—both Internet access service and a distinct 
transmission service, for example.  Thus, the transmission capability is part and parcel of, 
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former, the telecommunication component is subordinate, insignifi-
cant, and integral to the predominant information service.  In the lat-
ter, the telecommunication service predominates and triggers con-
ventional common carrier Title II regulation. 
Having opted to classify ISP services as information services, the 
FCC has dismissed the need for conventional Title II economic safe-
guards.  The Commission has concluded that it can largely exempt 
ISPs from regulation based on the Commission’s emphasis on the 
content generated or managed by the ISP.  Additionally, the Com-
mission perceives that the public interest does not require economic 
and behavioral regulation of ISPs.  The FCC’s emphasis on content 
and the Commission’s reticence in regulating content implies that 
ISPs have First Amendment speaker rights and that the Commission 
must respect these rights when applying any form of non-Title II, 
non-conduit related regulation.89 
C.  ISPs Can Operate as First Amendment Speakers 
Even as the FCC has ample reasons not to call attention to, and va-
lidate, ISPs’ First Amendment speaker rights, the Commission’s de-
termination that ISPs operate as information service providers none-
theless triggers some degree of First Amendment protection.  By 
definition, ISPs have the option of creating, processing, and other-
wise managing content as non-common carriers.  Put another way, 
the inapplicability of Title II common carrier regulations means that 
ISPs do not operate solely as neutral conduits.  When operating as 
non-conduits, ISPs perform tasks closely aligned with or analogous to 
 
and integral to, the Internet access service capabilities.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
wireline broadband Internet access service does not include the provision of a telecom-
munications service to the end user irrespective of how the service provider may decide to 
offer the transmission component to other service providers.” (footnote call numbers 
omitted)). 
 89 The FCC has largely avoided analysis of the permissible scope of First Amendment free-
dom applicable to ISPs and information service providers.  However, the Commission has 
noted that the Supreme Court made a general comparison of First Amendment speakers’ 
rights in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), where the Court elevated Internet speaker 
protections over those granted to broadcasters:  “[U]nlike the Internet, the broadcast 
medium has traditionally ‘received the most limited First Amendment protection.’”  
Broadcast of the Fox Television Network Program “Married By America,” 23 F.C.C.R. 
3222, 3234 n.74 (2008) (forfeiture order) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 867).  In 
the Reno case, which addressed the lawfulness of Internet content regulation designed to 
protect children from harm, the Court supported maximum First Amendment freedom 
for Internet-based speakers as compared to the comparatively less freedom available to 
broadcasters. 
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speaking, editing, and processing content.  ISPs create World Wide 
Web pages that contain content or offer links to content. 
Few would dispute that cable television operators qualify for First 
Amendment protection in light of their content selection and pack-
aging function.90  ISPs qualify for similar rights when serving as a plat-
form, interface, or intermediary for similar content.  Most ISPs offer 
access to both Internet-mediated content created by unaffiliated ven-
tures and to content that ISPs offer on the pages of their web sites.  
The term “walled garden”91 refers to content packaged by ventures 
such as ISPs and presented in ways that encourage subscribers to con-
tinue consuming content generated by the ISP or by affiliates and 
other ventures with which the ISP has an agreement to showcase and 
prioritize access. 
D.  Case Law Supports Limited Regulation of Internet-Mediated Speech 
Even as technological and market convergence further challenges 
a medium-specific application of the First Amendment, courts con-
tinue to identify varying degrees of speaker rights based on the type 
and nature of the transmission medium.  On a continuum running 
from least to most robust First Amendment speaker rights, the Inter-
net qualifies for maximum protection along with print journalism,92 
with cable television in the middle93 and broadcasting at the opposite 
 
 90 See Michael J. Burstein, Towards a New Standard for First Amendment Review of Structural Me-
dia Regulation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1030, 1053 (2004) (“In cable, the [Supreme] Court has 
held that the selection of channels offered to consumers on a cable network is an act of 
editorial discretion.  While arguably not the expression of a particular message, this deci-
sion still involves a choice of what content to present to an audience, and is therefore pro-
tected.” (citing City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Comm’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494–95 
(1986), Satellite Broad. & Commns Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 352–53 (4th Cir. 2001))); 
see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 739 (1996) 
(upholding cable television operator’s refusal to carry indecent programming on the op-
erator’s leased access channel as opposed to regulated public access channels). 
 91 See Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Com-
mercial Mobile Services, 23 F.C.C.R. 2241, 2315 (2008) (“Although U.S. mobile service 
providers tend to keep tight control on what applications are available and what services 
consumers can access on mobile handsets by selling content through their own branded 
portals (the ‘walled garden’ approach), operators have begun selectively to allow third-
party content providers to market multimedia content directly to their subscribers, in ex-
change for a share of the revenue generated by the sale of these services.” (footnote call 
number omitted)). 
 92 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 853 (“From the publisher’s point of view . . . [the Internet] consti-
tutes a vast platform from which to address and hear from a worldwide audience of mil-
lions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers.  Any person or organization with a 
computer connected to the Internet can ‘publish’ information.”). 
 93 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (holding that 
intermediate scrutiny supports “must carry” regulations, which primarily achieve econom-
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pole.94  In Reno v. ACLU,95 the Supreme Court considered the Internet 
a vast medium for the publication of ICE content worthy of substan-
tial protection from government regulation, even when the govern-
ment presents a compelling reason for intervening, e.g., protecting 
children from the potential harm resulting from access to obscene or 
indecent material.  On several occasions, the Internet’s importance as 
a mass medium of expression trumped legislative efforts to protect 
children from harmful Internet-mediated content.96  These cases of-
fer clear precedent mandating close scrutiny of content-based regula-
tions with the government bearing a substantial burden of demon-
strating that content-affecting regulations are narrowly drawn and do 
not unduly restrict lawful access to content by adults. 
The Supreme Court has not imposed such a high burden on gov-
ernment when seeking to regulate other media such as cable televi-
sion and broadcasting.  First, the Court has evidenced greater wil-
lingness to consider regulation in terms of achieving economic public 
policy goals as opposed to whether and how they affect speech.  The 
Court accepted the duty to balance speaker rights against other pub-
lic policy objectives such as promoting widespread access to certain 
types of media, e.g., commercial, advertiser-supported broadcasting.  
Second, the Court has acknowledged that media have different cha-
racteristics that affect accessibility and competitiveness.  Unlike the 
Internet, which heretofore has evidenced low barriers to market entry 
by content providers, other media have higher  market entry barriers, 
e.g., the need to install costly infrastructure, or to secure a govern-
ment-granted franchise or license to use public spectrum and rights 
of way.  For these types of media, the Court will examine regulation-
sponsoring law in the broader context of supporting public policy 
goals, especially ones articulated by Congress, as opposed to a nar-
rower view that the resulting regulations directly affect content and 
 
ic and social goals in requiring cable operators to relinquish a portion of their First 
Amendment content programming rights); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 
U.S. 622 (1994). 
 94 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (stating that pervasiveness and reach 
of broadcasting justifies content-based regulations); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 
367 (1969) (holding that the “fairness doctrine” promotes proper FCC regulations); Nat’l 
Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (noting that spectrum scarcity justifies 
regulation). 
 95 521 U.S. at 844. 
 96 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (stating that the prohibition on commer-
cial transmission of material harmful to minors is deemed unconstitutionally overbroad 
when less restrictive alternatives, such as filtering, are readily available). 
1308 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:5 
 
the right of a particular type of speaker, e.g., cable network operators 
versus television broadcasters. 
In the Turner “must carry” cases, a majority of the Supreme Court 
narrowly ruled twice that a law mandating carriage of broadcast tele-
vision channels by cable television operators was content-neutral and 
therefore subject to a less onerous level of scrutiny.97  The Court af-
firmed a law that forced cable operators to subordinate their First 
Amendment content selection and packaging speaker rights to the 
congressionally identified national interest accruing from mandatory 
carriage of commercial broadcast content.  Not willing to allow mar-
ketplace forces to operate, which arguably would have created neces-
sary incentives for cable operators to carry subscriber-desired broad-
cast content, the Court endorsed the notion that the legislature could 
impose access and carriage requirements that served the national in-
terest, i.e., continued viability of commercial broadcasters, even as 
they prioritized First Amendment rights between cable operators, tel-
evision broadcasters, providers of content available only via cable tel-
evision, and consumers of each medium. 
E.  The FCC Tries to Dismiss the First Amendment Implication of Its Decisions 
The FCC has attempted to frame its regulation of ISPs as having 
no First Amendment consequences whatsoever.  By avoiding any First 
Amendment analysis, the FCC does not consider it necessary to state 
whether any regulation of ISPs impacts content or the speaker rights 
of ISPs.  Such avoidance also supports the FCC’s goal of justifying 
regulatory forbearance in most instances, coupled with the option of 
applying selective regulation on an ad hoc, as-needed basis.  This 
pursuit of absolute flexibility supports the FCC’s predisposition not to 
regulate Internet-based operators, while nevertheless reserving the 
option to regulate whenever the Commission deems it necessary.  In 
addition to creating significant uncertainty about the nature, scope, 
 
 97 See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 224–25 (“We cannot displace Congress’ judgment respecting 
content-neutral regulations with our own, so long as its policy is grounded on reasonable 
factual findings supported by evidence that is substantial for a legislative determination.  
Those requirements were met in this case, and in these circumstances the First Amend-
ment requires nothing more.”); Turner I, 512 U.S. at 649 (“In short, Congress’ acknowl-
edgment that broadcast television stations make a valuable contribution to the Nation’s 
communications system does not render the must-carry scheme content[-]based.  The 
scope and operation of the challenged provisions make clear, in our view, that Congress 
designed the must-carry provisions not to promote speech of a particular content, but to 
prevent cable operators from exploiting their economic power to the detriment of 
broadcasters, and thereby to ensure that all Americans, especially those unable to sub-
scribe to cable, have access to free television programming—whatever its content.”). 
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and reach of permissible regulation, the FCC creates uncertainty over 
what, if any, First Amendment speaker rights ISPs deserve. 
When confronted with ISP claims that FCC regulation thwarts 
their First Amendment speaker rights, the Commission has sought to 
frame the matter as a lawful extension of a regulatory mandate that 
has no impact on anyone’s First Amendment freedom: 
Nor do we find Time Warner Cable’s analogy of a broadband provider to 
a newspaper to be apt.  For one, the Commission is not dictating the con-
tent of any speech.  Nor are we persuaded that Comcast’s customers 
would attribute the content delivered by peer-to-peer applications to 
Comcast, rather than attributing them to the other parties with whom 
they have chosen to interact through those applications.  Under these 
circumstances, we find that our actions do not raise First Amendment 
concerns.98 
The FCC’s decision to apply the information services classification 
to ISPs supports the Commission’s view that it should not pervasively 
regulate the Internet, nor should the Commission meddle in a me-
dium that can support a more robust marketplace of ideas than what 
previous media achieved.  To support its service classification, as well 
as the reclassification of Digital Subscriber Line services from tele-
communications service to information service, the FCC emphasized 
that unregulated status would best achieve legislative mandates to 
promote widespread access to basic and advanced telecommunica-
tions and to promote content diversity.  In essence, promoting access 
to competing technologies and carriers helps achieve a parallel out-
come, namely a robust marketplace of ideas. 
III.  ISPS ALSO OPERATE AS NON-SPEAKER CONDUITS 
In addition to their content creation, selection and packaging 
function, ISPs operate or lease telecommunications facilities that 
transmit and deliver bit streams to and from subscribers.  Ordinarily 
the ISPs’ bit delivery function operates in an uncontroversial manner 
providing connectivity and accessibility for all subscribers.  ISPs inter-
connect their networks with the networks of other ISPs, a process that 
 
 98 Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,053 n.203 (2008) (memorandum opinion and or-
der) (internal citations omitted), rev’d, Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., No. 08-1291, slip op. 
(D.C. Cir. April 6, 2010), available at http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/
201004/08-1291-1238302.pdf.  Note that the FCC correctly states that subscribers 
attribute content to the identifiable source without considering whether and how the 
conduit provider might affect access.  Conduit operators can affect accessibility by specify-
ing and enforcing bit rate, priority status, and by slowing or throttling content delivery 
speeds when subscribers exceed monthly content downloading quotas.  Subscribers can-
not readily determine the cause of most instances where service has degraded.   
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collectively makes it possible to provide all subscribers with access to 
any other subscriber and sources of content within the Internet 
cloud.  From its inception, the protocols that establish standard oper-
ating procedures favor a non-discriminatory Internet offering “best 
efforts” routing of traffic on a first-come, first-serve basis.  Technolo-
gical innovations, coupled with compelling business needs, support 
deviation from absolute neutrality, including traffic prioritization that 
offers subscribers “better than best efforts” routing. 
Notwithstanding technological opportunities and business incen-
tives to operate in a non-neutral manner, ISPs can qualify for a near 
absolute insulation from liability for harms caused by the content 
they carry if they continue to operate in a neutral manner.  Section 
230(c) of the Communications Decency Act states that “[n]o provider 
or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the pub-
lisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”99 
This liability exemption has shielded ISPs from any legal respon-
sibility when another person creates content that results in, or contri-
butes to, such harms as defamation,100 sexual assault,101 and violations 
of civil rights.102  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) 
provides ISPs with a safe harbor exemption from secondary copyright 
infringement liability when they operate as neutral conduits and 
agree to remove infringing content upon notice.103 
 
 99 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). 
100 See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that even though the edi-
tor of a newsletter made choices whether to include or not include electronic mail sub-
missions, the inclusion of defamatory content alleging Nazi affiliation of an art dealer did 
not trigger loss of the § 230 safe harbor); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 922 F. Supp. 44 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (holding that unproven allegation of wife abuse did not trigger liability for 
America Online based on its lack of content management); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that § 230(c)(1) confers immunity on service pro-
viders for both publisher and distributor liability with respect to tort claims). 
101 See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that a social network-
ing site is not responsible for sexual assault occurring when a girl lied about her age to 
access the site). 
102 See, e.g., Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 
F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that § 230(c)(1) creates a definition that removes on-
line services such as Craigslist from the ranks of publishers and speakers for the purposes 
of substantive law, including housing anti-discrimination laws).  But cf., Fair Hous. Coun-
cil of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (refus-
ing to apply the § 230 safe harbor when the web site operator contributed to and facili-
tated the creation of content expressing discriminatory preferences for sharing housing). 
103 Section 512(a) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006), states 
that: 
[A] service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided 
in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copy-
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A.  Laws Now Incorrectly Assume ISPs Lack the Ability or Incentive to 
Monitor, Filter, Edit, and Otherwise Manage Content 
Safe harbor provisions in the CDA and the DMCA offer liability 
exemptions based on the assumption that an ISP could not effectively 
operate its business if it had to provide content management func-
tions.104  At the time these laws were enacted, technological means did 
not exist for low cost, effective, and instantaneous monitoring and fil-
tering of harmful content.  Even if such capabilities had existed, 
Congress opted to provide exemptions so that the Internet could 
thrive as a robust, largely unregulated forum for expression.  The 
drafters of safe harbor exemptions may not have contemplated the 
breadth and depth of the harms Internet-mediated communications 
can cause, but they did legislate exemptions with a clear intention of 
freeing ISPs from liability if the carriers opted for conduit neutrality 
in lieu of content management.  As time passes from enactment of 
the CDA and the DMCA, technologies for monitoring, filtering, and 
inspecting content have substantially improved.  ISPs now can elect to 
use techniques that identify content flagged as copyright protected, 
tagged as qualifying for priority delivery, and externally classifiable as 
 
right by reason of the provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing connections 
for, material through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the ser-
vice provider, or by reason of the intermediate and transient storage of that ma-
terial in the course of such transmitting, routing, or providing connections, if— 
      (1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of a 
person other than the service provider;  
      (2) the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is carried 
out through an automatic technical process without selection of the material by 
the service provider;  
      (3) the service provider does not select the recipients of the material except 
as an automatic response to the request of another person;  
      (4) no copy of the material made by the service provider in the course of 
such intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the system or network 
in a manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipients, 
and no such copy is maintained on the system or network in a manner ordina-
rily accessible to such anticipated recipients for a longer period than is reason-
ably necessary for the transmission, routing, or provision of connections; and  
      (5) the material is transmitted through the system or network without mod-
ification of its content. 
  A service provider is defined as “an entity offering transmission, routing, or providing of 
connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a 
user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the ma-
terial as sent or received,” or “a provider of online services or network access, or the op-
erator of facilities thereof.”  Id. § 512(k)(1)(A)–(B). 
104 See Lemley & Reese, supra note 34, at 1369 (“Congress enacted the safe harbors in re-
sponse to concerns expressed by online service providers about their potentially over-
whelming liability for copyright infringement [and other offenses] committed by their 
users.”). 
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possibly harmful.105  ISPs increasingly have operational and financial 
incentives to employ traffic interrogation techniques, including deep 
packet inspection,106 a technique that enables an ISP to examine, on a 
“real time” basis, both routing information contained in the header, 
as well as the actual content contained in the payload portion of every 
packet that traverses the ISP’s network. 
These “packet sniffing” technologies107 can help ISPs operate 
more efficiently and with less risk of harm to their network caused by 
a cascade of service requests designed to cause congestion or outages, 
proliferation of undesired commercial messages commonly referred 
to as spam, and the variable, legitimate service demands of subscrib-
ers.  These technologies also can help ISPs offer new services that fa-
cilitate non-neutral network operation with an eye toward providing 
customized services that prioritize or downgrade traffic streams based 
on classifications of customers and the traffic they generate for down-
stream or upstream delivery.108 
Arguably, ISPs no longer operate as neutral conduits when they 
employ deep packet inspection and other techniques that prioritize 
traffic based on a variety of service discrimination criteria.  Such non-
neutral operation surely can better match individual customer re-
quirements with ISP efforts to accommodate specific wants and 
needs.  But such non-neutrality also calls into question whether the 
ISP can continue to qualify for safe harbor exemptions based on its 
lack of ability to monitor and manage content, or assumptions that 
content management would constitute an unreasonable operational 
 
105 See Rob Frieden, supra note 37, at 636–37 (“ISPs have upgraded, or soon will upgrade, 
their networks with hardware and software that enables them to acquire knowledge about 
what kinds of content they switch, route and transmit.”). 
106 See Cisco Systems, Optimizing Application Traffic with Cisco Service Control Technology, 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6150/prod_brochure0900aecd80241955
.html (last visited May 11, 2010) (“Using stateful deep packet inspection, operators can 
optimize traffic on their networks, thereby increasing efficient use of network resources, 
reducing costs, and maximizing capital investment.  State-of-the-art bandwidth manage-
ment can be applied to network traffic on a global, subscriber, or individual flow-level 
hierarchy, helping ensure that operators can better manage network resource distribu-
tion.”). 
107 See What Your Broadband Provider Knows About Your Web Use:  Deep Packet Inspection and Com-
munications Laws and Policies:  Hearing Before the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th 
Cong. (2008), available at  http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&®id=1400&catid=32&Itemid=58 (last visited May 11, 2010). 
108 See M. CHRIS RILEY & BEN SCOTT, FREEPRESS, DEEP PACKET INSPECTION:  THE END OF THE 
INTERNET AS WE KNOW IT?  (2009), http://www.freepress.net/files/Deep_Packet_
Inspection_The_End_of_the_Internet_As_We_Know_It.pdf (explaining that the discrim-
ination of Internet messages is now possible due to technologies such as deep packet in-
spection). 
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or financial burden on ISPs.  When an ISP takes affirmative steps to 
manage content so that it can offer a variety of non-neutral network 
and content management services, the ISP arguably has migrated 
from a neutral conduit provider to an active content manager.  Af-
firmative steps voluntarily taken by ISPs to manage content arguably 
should trigger not only First Amendment speaker status, but also void 
or reduce the near complete safe harbor liability exemptions ISPs 
currently secure. 
IV.  THE DEBATE ABOUT NETWORK NEUTRALITY RAISES FIRST 
AMENDMENT ISSUES 
In addition to their Internet access conduit function, most ISPs 
manage content as editors, moderators, distributors, contractors, and 
creators.  ISPs construct World Wide Web pages and erect a readily 
available walled garden of content on their Web sites.  While sub-
scribers can maneuver outside the ISP’s walled garden to access other 
content having no affiliation with the ISP, the fact that ISPs offer a 
package of preselected content raises First Amendment issues.  As a 
threshold matter, ISPs qualify for some degree of First Amendment 
protection in their capacity as content packagers, in much the same 
way as cable television operators load channels of content onto vari-
ous programming tiers of service.  Having so qualified, conflicting 
First Amendment protection claims may arise between ISPs and unaf-
filiated content providers upstream, who need to have their content 
traverse one or more ISP networks to reach consumers, and between 
ISPs and their subscribers downstream. 
Remarkably, the debate over network neutrality has largely ig-
nored the First Amendment,109 perhaps because various commenta-
tors can stake their claims on more concrete foundations.  For ISPs, 
the right to operate non-neutral networks involves network manage-
ment functions as well as the sovereignty of property owners to de-
termine who qualifies for access to their networks and on what terms 
and conditions.  Network neutrality opponents have emphasized 
economic factors such as the disincentives to infrastructure invest-
ment that mandatory network neutrality requirements would impose.  
 
109 But see Balkin, supra note 39, at 427 (noting that while decisions affecting free speech on 
the Internet may focus on technological design, they should also focus on the First 
Amendment and constitutional law).  See generally Nicholas P. Dickerson, supra note 65, at 
61 (discussing that all governmental regulation of the Internet must be done within the 
boundaries set forth by the First Amendment); Moran Yemini, supra note 39, at 1 (ex-
plaining that the First Amendment has as much to do with the debate over network neu-
trality as do the “economic and technological aspects of Internet governance”).  
1314 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:5 
 
Network neutrality advocates have framed the debate in broad terms 
about how discriminatory practices would harm the Internet’s utility, 
and more narrowly, in terms of whether start up ventures could reach 
critical mass if they had to pay more to reach consumers. 
In light of the increasing importance of the Internet as both a 
conduit for access to ICE content and as the medium constructed by 
ISPs to deliver packaged content, First Amendment conflicts will 
arise.  Indeed, the network neutrality issue, considered in the context 
of the First Amendment, requires an assessment of whose rights pre-
dominate when interests conflict.  Do ISPs have comparatively more 
robust rights than both their subscribers and unaffiliated and com-
peting sources of content because ISPs participate in a robust mar-
ketplace, as measured in economic terms and more general notions 
of accessibility of ideas?110  Do competing sources of content have 
comparatively more robust rights to compensate for the ability and 
incentive of ISPs to control access to the Internet cloud, especially for 
the first and last links,111 i.e., from content sources into the Internet 
cloud and onward, downstream to end users, and from end users 
through primarily DSL and cable modem links upstream into the In-
ternet cloud?  Do end users have comparatively more robust rights 
based on the Internet’s importance to a participatory democracy, and 
perhaps also based on the fact that most ISPs have secured access to 
their subscribers using public resources, e.g., rights of way over public 
 
110 See Hannibal Travis, Of Blogs, EBooks, and Broadband:  Access to Digital Media as a First 
Amendment Right, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1519, 1575 (2007) (“Opponents of net neutrality 
requirements have opined that the First Amendment rights of corporate owners of tele-
communications infrastructure should trump the First Amendment rights of individual 
speakers and users of telecommunications media.  Under this view, the foremost free 
speech interests on the Internet are those of broadband infrastructure owners, rather 
than the senders and recipients of Internet speech such as Web content, blogs, eBooks, 
or online videos.”). 
111 See Jack M. Balkin, Media Access:  A Question of Design, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 933, 942–43 
(2008) (“Thus, if we want to promote media access today, we need to look beyond the 
boundaries of judicially created First Amendment rights.  Telecommunications regula-
tion—and, in particular, the debate over open access and network neutrality—has impor-
tant consequences for media access.  To be sure, network neutrality policies prevent cer-
tain forms of content censorship by conduits, and open access policies promote 
competition among ISPs that will lead at least some ISPs to promise not to censor.  Yet, a 
more important argument for these policies is that they might promote innovation in 
content delivery, applications, and content production that comes from entrepreneurs 
outside the current duopoly of cable and phone companies.  People should be able to 
create new applications to be laid on top of the broadband network without fear that they 
will be blocked by broadband providers.  And individuals and start-ups should be able to 
serve not only text, but also video and multimedia, without fear that they will be blocked 
or slowed down because their content and applications compete with broadband compa-
nies or their business partners.”). 
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roads and property secured with limited direct compensation paid by 
cable television and telephone companies as well as use of public 
spectrum by wireless ventures?112 
A. ISPs’ First Amendment Freedoms 
The need to recoup broadband investments and generate profits, 
coupled with enhanced packet sniffing technologies, evidences both 
incentives and the ability of ISPs to exercise First Amendment rights 
by operating non-neutral networks.  Non-neutrality supports price 
and quality of service discrimination as well as an interest in execut-
ing service contracts that provide certain content providers with pre-
ferential access to the ISP’s subscribers.  Some types of discrimination 
do not adversely impact First Amendment values, but other types do.  
In the former category, customer-tiering options offer end users dif-
ferent levels of service in terms of bit transmission speed offered or 
guaranteed and the permissible amount of content that a subscriber 
can download in a month without triggering surcharges, or bit rate 
“throttling,” i.e., deliberate reductions imposed by the ISP on the 
speed of content delivery. 
In the latter category, ISPs can engage in access-tiering strategies 
that exceed reasonable targeting of individual content providers for 
preferential access to subscribers and expedited delivery of content.  
Arguably, ISPs trigger First Amendment concerns when they couple 
affirmative efforts to expedite and favor the content of preferred cus-
tomers with additional deliberate efforts to impede, delay, and even 
block traffic of non-preferred customers, despite having ample 
transmission capacity and bit-processing resources to maintain a base-
line of acceptable service.  While offering “better than best efforts” 
routing favors one type of speech over other types and one speaker 
over others, such offers constitute a normal business practice where 
the quality of access is offered as a function of price elasticity, i.e., the 
willingness and ability to pay for access.  Because ISPs are neither 
charities nor common carriers, they should have ample opportunities 
to prioritize bit streams and offer superior service to customers will-
ing and able to pay a premium. 
On the other hand, the ability to offer premium service and the 
resulting prioritization of traffic and messages does not include the 
option to handicap and degrade non-premium paying subscribers to 
make the premium service qualitatively even better, or to punish cus-
 
112 Before the need to competitively bid for auctioned spectrum, wireless carriers received 
licenses at low cost. 
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tomers who have refused to pay for premium service.  First Amend-
ment values are not adversely impacted when an ISP devises creative 
ways to improve service or to offer optional service enhancements.  
However, such values are harmed when ISPs offer premium service, 
not by providing technological enhancements, but by providing pre-
ferred customers or corporate affiliates with premium access simply 
by handicapping, degrading, blocking, or otherwise thwarting the 
speed, quality, and reach of non-preferred speakers.  The adverse 
impact on First Amendment values occurs most significantly when an 
ISP operates a non-neutral conduit not just to generate new revenue 
streams, but also to achieve additional benefits, some of which may 
not be easily quantified or measured in terms of direct financial ben-
efits. 
Put another way, when ISPs operate their conduit function in a 
non-neutral way, the First Amendment rights of speakers upstream 
and subscribers downstream may be impacted negatively if the ISP 
engages in discrimination designed not to provide legitimate pre-
mium delivery services for an additional fee, but to discipline, punish, 
competitively handicap, and otherwise degrade or block messages of 
disfavored customers.  While largely speculative or anecdotal,113 such 
First Amendment-implicating strategies appear to be feasible options 
for ISPs to pursue when they infer that ample competitive public rela-
tions or financial opportunities exist. 
First Amendment values may not always be implicated if an ISP 
engages in discrimination solely to favor its services or those offered 
by affiliates.  While punishable as unreasonable economic discrimina-
tion and a violation of a statutory mission articulated for the FCC, 
e.g., to promote access to basic and advanced telecommunications 
services, efforts by a rural telephone company to block DSL-mediated 
access to competitive long distance telephone services probably does 
not impact the First Amendment.  Blocking a competitive alternative, 
VoIP telephone service, to the company’s dial-up long distance ser-
vice does not thwart access to a competitive marketplace of ideas.  
Similarly, Comcast’s use of software to detect and degrade peer-to-
peer file transfers does not impact First Amendment values unless the 
 
113 For example, the FCC has investigated only two instances where an ISP has deliberately 
interfered with traffic without legitimate network management justifications.  See Madison 
River Communications, LLC, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005) (order) (detailing an FCC Consent 
Decree with a small, rural telephone company that included a voluntary payment of 
$15,000 to the Federal Treasury for blocking DSL subscriber access to Internet-based 
voice communications services). 
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content carried in these transfers would no longer be available for 
sharing and dissemination. 
ISPs adversely impact the First Amendment interests of content 
providers and/or subscribers when non-neutral network operating 
strategies succeed in substantially blocking access to specific messages 
and types of content.  The Supreme Court affirmed compulsory car-
riage of broadcast television signals on both economic grounds and a 
sense that First Amendment values would be frustrated if such car-
riage did not occur.  Mandatory carriage of broadcast television sig-
nals provides an economic boost to broadcasters, i.e., shelf space on 
an increasingly important distribution technology.  But more impor-
tant in terms of the First Amendment was the Court’s inference that 
without such carriage, the marketplace of ideas would suffer when 
few cable subscribers would take the affirmative steps necessary to 
configure their television sets to continue receiving broadcast signals 
when these sets plug into cable television networks that have refused 
to carry broadcast television channels. 
When ISPs block or degrade certain types of traffic and the con-
tent of specific vendors, few consumers may know the source and 
cause of such deteriorating access.  Fewer still will have the technolo-
gical knowhow and follow-through to devise ways to continue access-
ing such disfavored content or to counter quality of service degrada-
tion by an ISP.  Even if competitive alternatives and different 
technological options exist, First Amendment values suffer when ISPs 
successfully block or degrade content access because consumers can-
not, or do not, pursue remedies. 
V.  ISPS SHOULD NOT HAVE TWIN OPTIONS FOR AVOIDING SAFEGUARDS 
SIMPLY BECAUSE REGULATORS AND COURTS APPLY AN UNCALIBRATED 
DEFAULT OPTION 
Nothing in the Communications Act or the FCC’s administrative 
rules requires the Commission to shoehorn every ISP line of business 
into a single regulatory classification.  The Communications Act es-
tablishes separate service definitions linked to different regulatory 
requirements, but nothing in the Act explicitly states that only one 
service definition can apply to a single venture.  At least in theory, the 
FCC has found it possible to apply multiple regulatory classifications 
as it nominally applies Title II “common carrier” regulation to cell 
phone carriers’ voice telephone services, while at the same time sub-
jecting these same carriers to negligible information service regula-
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tion in their capacity as wireless broadband Internet access provid-
ers.114 
The FCC’s decision to apply a single “information service” regula-
tory classification for everything offered by an ISP reflects the FCC’s 
interest in administrative convenience and a preference for applying 
the least intrusive regulatory classification.  While one might applaud 
the FCC’s inclination not to regulate and expand its oversight 
wingspan, in practice the Commission replaces this strategy with se-
lective re-regulation on occasions where the Commission pragmati-
cally needs to come up with a way to remedy the consequences of its 
regulatory forbearance.  Examples of after the fact re-regulation of 
information service providers include the decision to establish parity 
in regulatory burdens between certain types of VoIP service providers 
and their conventional Title II regulated competitors.  VoIP service 
providers, which offer services that access conventional phone num-
bers, must make compulsory universal service subsidies115 and under-
take expensive service retrofits to make VoIP functionally equivalent 
to conventional dial-up telephone service in terms of accessibility for 
wiretaps by law enforcement officials,116 use by persons with hearing 
disabilities,117 and access to emergency services, including automatic 
location identification.118 
The Supreme Court validated the Commission’s decision to estab-
lish an either/or dichotomy between telecommunications services 
and information services.  In National Cable and Telecommunications As-
sociation v. Brand X Internet Services,119 the Supreme Court affirmed the 
 
114 Compare Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service 
Providers, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,817, 15,824 (2007) (report, order, and further notice of pro-
posed rulemaking) (reiterating common carrier requirements for cell phone service pro-
viders) with Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet 
Over Wireless Networks, 22 F.C.C.R. 5901, 5909 (2007) (declaratory ruling) (declaring 
wireless broadband access an information service). 
115 Universal Service Contribution Methodology, 21 F.C.C.R. 7518 (2006) (report, order, and 
notice of proposed rulemaking) (extending § 254(d) permissive authority to require in-
terconnected VoIP providers to contribute to the USF), petition for review denied and va-
cated in part on other grounds, Vonage Holdings Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
116 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Servic-
es, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,989, 15,001–02 (2005) (first report, order, and notice of proposed 
rulemaking), aff’d, Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
117 IP-Enabled Services, 22 F.C.C.R. 11,275 (2007) (report and order), on partial reconsidera-
tion, 22 F.C.C.R. 18,319 (2007). 
118 IP-Enabled Services, 20 F.C.C.R. 10,245 (2005), aff’d, Nuvio Corp. v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302 
(D.C. Cir. 2006). 
119 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (upholding the FCC’s determination that cable modem provided 
Internet access constitutes an information service); see also Rob Frieden, Neither Fish nor 
Fowl:  New Strategies for Selective Regulation of Information Services, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
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lawfulness of the FCC’s classification of cable modem Internet access 
as an information service, largely on administrative law precedent fa-
voring deference to the expertise of expert regulatory agencies.120  
The Court may have to revisit the nature and scope of such deference 
and the extent to which the FCC can re-regulate information services 
based on a broad public interest mandate contained in Title I of the 
Communications Act, having determined that Title II does not ap-
ply.121 
The FCC has stated that it has statutory authority to establish and 
enforce rules of conduct on ISPs, like cable modem service provider 
Comcast, even in the absence of a direct link to Title II common car-
rier services.  The Commission established apparently binding rules 
without notice-and-comment rulemaking, based in part on its deter-
mination that it need only establish a “Policy Statement” which 
creates policies that, if ignored, would trigger liability for a monetary 
forfeiture.122  Remarkably, in the FCC’s articulation of the statutory 
grounds justifying what appears as regulatory oversight and potential 
limitation on ISPs’ First Amendment freedoms, the Commission in-
voked § 230 of the Communications Act, which lies within Title II of 
the Communications Act—the part of the law applicable to “common 
carrier” telecommunications service providers.  Section 230 creates 
the non-publisher/non-speaker classification for ISPs.  Section 230 
also offers a safe harbor exemption from liability when an ISP acts as 
a “good Samaritan” to restrict or block access to content that it deems 
“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitu-
tionally protected.”123  In addition, the statute articulates that “[i]t is 
the policy of the United States . . . to promote the continued devel-
opment of the Internet and other interactive computer services and 
other interactive media.”124  The Commission uses this broad policy 
pronouncement to justify its decision to apply the largely unregulated 
 
TECH. L., 373 (2008) (noting that the FCC may have overstepped its boundaries with its 
deregulatory campaign).  See generally Rob Frieden, What Do Pizza Delivery and Information 
Services Have in Common?  Lessons From Recent Judicial and Regulatory Struggles with Conver-
gence, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 247 (2006) (writing that because the FCC can-
not make either/or distinctions between services, competition is muddled in the market-
place). 
120 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 986–1000 (applying the Chevron standard of review to the FCC’s 
decision). 
121 See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 579 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
122 E.g., Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facili-
ties, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, 14988 (2005) (policy statement). 
123 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2006). 
124 Id. § 230(b). 
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“information service” classification, as well as its decision to impose 
what constitutes binding regulatory requirements on information ser-
vice providers. 
Courts generally have supported the dichotomous treatment 
created by the FCC.  Additionally, most cases requiring an analysis of 
§ 230 end up applying the safe harbor exemption without qualifica-
tion.  Little empirical analysis is required to determine whether an 
ISP actually operated neutrally.  Courts appear to assume neutrality, 
notwithstanding the fact that when an ISP acts to block or restrict 
content as a “good Samaritan,” the ISP is acting in a manner that is 
anything but neutral.  An ISP can do nothing to retain its appearance 
as a neutral conduit, but may nonetheless qualify for similar non-
liability when operating in a non-neutral manner by opting to ex-
amine content to determine if the content poses harm.  Given the 
new and expanding upside financial opportunities offered by deep 
packet inspection, and noting that ISPs need not lose their safe har-
bor qualification, it appears that ISPs may become more active moni-
tors of content.  Such activity may adversely impact the First Amend-
ment speaker rights of content creators subject to filtering, blocking, 
and other restrictions.  Additionally, such activity belies the assump-
tion that the ISPs’ baseline mode is one of neutrality, having no po-
tential whatsoever to either make First Amendment-impacting judg-
ments about content, or to favor one type of speaker or speech vis-à-
vis others. 
A. When ISPs Operate in a Non-Neutral Manner, They Qualify as First 
Amendment Speakers and Publishers Whose Rights May Conflict with 
Subscribers and Other Content Providers 
Marketplace conditions, including the opportunity to pursue new 
revenue streams, create attractive incentives for ISPs to operate in a 
non-neutral manner.  When ISPs make this election, they qualify as 
First Amendment speakers and publishers and may not lose certain 
safe harbor liability exemptions.  However, this election should not 
place ISPs in a superior position vis-à-vis their subscribers, or compet-
ing content providers, in terms of First Amendment protections.  The 
potential exists for ISPs to establish superiority based on their control 
of the conduit used to deliver content and perhaps the residual, but 
no longer valid, assumption that ISPs remain neutral conduit provid-
ers. 
When ISPs jointly operate as content publishers, speakers, and 
packagers, as well as conduit providers, they can easily commingle 
these roles, ostensibly to achieve synergies and efficiencies.  But 
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whatever the operating efficiency gains, the potential exists for ISPs 
to exploit undifferentiated status in ways that secure unfair competi-
tive advantages by unreasonably stifling, subordinating, and otherwise 
handicapping particular traffic flows.  The ISP might mask its anti-
competitive motivations on grounds that it had to block traffic, drop 
packets, throttle traffic delivery speeds, or degrade service to specific 
types of traffic or customer for legitimate-sounding network man-
agement rationales.  Because so much of non-neutral network opera-
tion occurs without easy detection and forensic examination by sub-
scribers or an expert government agency, an ISP could easily claim 
network management needs when in fact it had mixed motivations.  
When the FCC sanctioned Comcast for interfering with subscribers’ 
peer-to-peer traffic, even in the absence of network congestion, the 
company persisted in claiming network management requirements 
necessitated such intervention.  Comcast could just as easily have had 
an additional or primary motivation to create disincentives for its 
broadband subscribers to use the company’s conduit for sharing vid-
eo content that offered a competitive alternative to the company’s 
other commercial video programming services, including cable tele-
vision and pay-per-view access to premium content. 
Most ISPs manage their networks and provide new, non-neutral 
quality of service differentiating services with limited, if any, transpa-
rency.  ISPs specify in their service contracts non-negotiable terms for 
ordinary subscribers, including residential users of DSL and cable 
modem service.  Such ISPs provide no service level agreements and 
bear no duty to disclose whether and how they deviate from the cus-
tomary “best efforts routing” of traffic.  As ISPs find new technologi-
cal ways to provide non-neutral service and as they continue to perce-
ive increasing financial benefits from service diversification, the need 
for government-mandated transparency grows. 
VI.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Internet continues to evolve and diversify.  ISPs and their cus-
tomers can benefit when price and quality of service discrimination 
make it possible for the ISP to customize services and offer more than 
a one-size-fits-all, plain vanilla service package.  The motivations to 
create different Internet access services may also prompt an ISP to 
pursue network management practices designed to favor corporate 
affiliates and other ventures that have partnered with the ISP or that 
have paid a premium for a type of service unavailable to anyone else.  
ISPs do not engage in unfair trade practices when they offer “better 
than best efforts” routing, or even when they deliberately favor the 
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content of certain ventures by facilitating a faster, better, smarter, 
and more convenient routing of their traffic.  But it becomes quite 
easy, absent transparency and regulatory oversight, for an ISP to cross 
the line and use network management as a blanket justification for 
tactics designed to handicap competitors by blocking, throttling, de-
laying, and dropping traffic packets. 
The First Amendment interests of subscribers and unaffiliated, 
and possibly competing, content providers should force any ISP offer-
ing non-neutral service to adhere to several best practices standards.  
Requiring transparency in operation, imposing reporting require-
ments, and intervening in disputes does not constitute an unlawful or 
unreasonable intervention by a government agency, be it the FCC, 
Federal Trade Commission, or Justice Department.  Transparency in 
operation means that ISPs should have the duty to disclose what types 
of quality of service diversification it offers subscribers, including the 
disclosure of any “most favored nation” or other exclusive arrange-
ments relating to how the ISPs route traffic both upstream into the 
Internet cloud and downstream from the cloud to subscribers.  ISPs 
should regularly report to the FCC traffic statistics, including any in-
stance where the ISP had to downgrade service based on congestion 
or had agreed by contract to expedite traffic delivery for specific types 
of traffic and customers. 
An ideal regulatory mechanism exists that would provide consum-
er safeguards while allowing ISPs to pursue non-neutral service diver-
sification.  This mechanism calls for the structural separation between 
the ISP’s conduit function and its content creation, management, 
publishing, and packaging functions.  Such separation does not bi-
furcate the ISP into a common carrier and non-carrier entity, but in-
stead imposes rules for ensuring that the ISP’s content-related ven-
tures compete on a level, competitive playing field in the marketplace 
of ideas and in the commercial marketplace. 
One can readily expect ISPs to object to structural separation on 
the same grounds as the telephone companies objected to the Com-
puter Inquiry rules.  Many of the largest ISPs are subsidiaries of the tel-
ephone companies that convinced the FCC that structural separation 
would result in lost operating efficiencies, create disincentives for in-
vestment in next generation infrastructure, and prevent the tele-
phone companies from becoming effective competitors outside basic 
telecommunications markets.  While these companies vociferously 
objected to structural separation between telecommunications and 
information services, on their own initiative they have employed 
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structural separation, or complete divestiture in other more closely 
related markets, such as wireless telephone service125 and telephone 
directory publishing.126  Even as the FCC has abandoned structural sa-
feguards, governments in the United Kingdom,127 New Zealand,128 and 
Australia,129 as well as individual commercial telecommunications ven-
tures, have considered or implemented this option.  The FCC never 
provided empirical evidence showing the monetary impact of struc-
tural safeguards or how these requirements concretely stifled invest-
ment, innovation, and operating synergies. 
Structural separation also would remedy the apparent inability of 
the FCC and courts to deal with a single venture that pursues tele-
communications, information processing, and video markets.  The 
separation would not necessarily result in one regulated and one or 
more unregulated ventures.  Instead, it would require ventures that 
operate conduits to provide access to affiliates and competitors on a 
fair commercial basis, neither compelled to provide access to anyone 
on a common carrier basis, nor obligated to file public tariffs for all 
services offered.  Structural separation of an ISP’s conduit and con-
tent functions, the duty to operate in a transparent fashion, modest 
reporting requirements, and formal dispute resolution rules should 
 
125 See Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, 24 F.C.C.R. 6185 (2009) (“Verizon Wireless is a joint venture of Verizon Communi-
cations, Inc. (‘Verizon’) and Vodafone Group PLC (‘Vodafone’).  Verizon owns 55 per-
cent of Verizon Wireless, and Vodafone owns 45 percent.”). 
126 See Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, Inc., Applications for Approval of Transfer of 
Control, 20 F.C.C.R. 18,433, 18,439 (2005) (memorandum opinion and order) (“Veri-
zon’s subsidiary, Information Services, operates directory publishing businesses and pro-
vides electronic commerce services.”). 
127 See United Kingdom Office of Communications, Implementation of BT’s Undertakings, 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/btundertakings/ (last visited May 11, 2010) (stating 
that British Telecom, the dominant telecommunications service provider established an 
operationally separate business unit to provide access to network services for other BT 
business units and competitors). 
128 See Government of New Zealand,  Ministry of Economic Development, Operational Sepa-
ration of Telecom, http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/ContentTopicSummary
____26310.aspx (last visited May 11, 2010) (describing how Telecom New Zealand, the 
dominant, incumbent carrier, split itself into three separate ventures serving wholesale, 
retail and network markets). 
129 See AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK:  REGULATORY REFORM 
FOR 21ST CENTURY BROADBAND DISCUSSION PAPER 17 (2009), available at http://www.
dbcde.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/110013/NBN_Regulatory_Reform_for_the_2
1st_Century_Broadband_low_res_web.pdf (considering the need for structural separation 
in lieu of ineffectual accounting and regulatory oversight); Functional Separation, Op. 
European Regulators Group, http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Document. 
3659.pdf (last visited May 11, 2010). 
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accrue ample dividends, including assurance of parity between the 
ISP, its subscribers, and unaffiliated content providers. 
